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Abstract 
This thesis argues that Charles Olson's place within the American poetic tradition 
is more than simply being either an imitator of a certain type of modernity or a catalyst for 
a radical postmodernity. Olson's designation as a postmodem figure must therefore be 
seen in a new and different way than has been established thus far in Olson criticism. I will 
argue that Charles Olson's oeuvre is best understood through a reevaluation of his position 
as a nexus between the modem and postmodem periods. Instead of seeing the modem as 
a separate totality from the postmodern, this thesis will investigate the division of these 
two entities in terms of Michel Foucault's conception of the episteme. Here the 
boundaries between the underlying sets of rules that govern the discourse of the modem 
episteme and the postmodern episteme become less a solid foundation for placing Olson 
neatly within the American literary tradition than the polemical separation that these terms 
actually imply. In pursuing this course of inquiry, I intend to establish a greater realization 
of the dynamic nature of postmodem American avant-garde poetry through Charles 
Olson's critique of modern discourse. 
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Chapter 1 
1.1 Charles Olson: From Bureaucrat to Poet 
The first realization that one comes to when confronted by Charles Olson's poetry 
and prose is the diversity of his interests, stemming from an almost limitless source of 
literary, philosophical, historical, and pedagogical knowledge. Similarly, Olson's 
biographical history is as diverse as the knowledge he pursued during his poetic career. 
After dropping out of his PhD program in American Studies at Harvard, Olson had a brief 
career in the political administration ofRoosevelt's Washington, where he was the 
Assistant Chief of the Foreign Language Section in the Office of War Information. 
However, Olson resigned from this position in protest over the then director's policies. 
After his career as a Washington bureaucrat, Olson became the first American poet to 
embrace the term "postmodem" (Butterick ''Postmodem" 4-6), and became rector of the 
experimental Black Mountain College (1951-6), professor at both the University of 
Connecticut and the State University ofNew York (SUNY) at Buffalo, and participated in 
Timothy Leary's LSD experiments between December of 1960 to February of 1961 
(Muthologos 1: 20). Olson was born in Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1910, to an Irish-
American mother and a Swedish-American father, and perhaps because of his background 
felt marginalised :from the Puritan aristocracy that dominated mainstream Massachusetts 
literary and social life. A radicalism would eventually manifest itself in Olson's poetry and 
prose as a response to established tradition in society, poetry, and thought. Olson would 
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be the first American poet to accept and use the term "postmodem" (Allen and Friedlander 
10), and his call to others to write "projective verse" embraced what Allen and Butterick 
have called the "idiosyntactic" flexibility that enabled postmodem American poetry to 
oppose the "centrist values" of"unity," "significance," and "linearity'' that characterised 
the formalism of the poetics of the New Criticism (Allen and Butterick 10; Hoover xxvi-
xxvii). Olson was educated at Wesleyan, Yale, and Harvard, which he left after 
completing his course work towards a PhD in American Studies, without having submitted 
a thesis. He died on January 10, 1970 in New York Hospital after a briefbattle with liver 
cancer. He was immediately recognised by The New York Times as a major American 
postwar poet (Christensen 21). His library from his house in Gloucester, Massachusetts, 
was purchased by the University of Connecticut and is now the Charles Olson Archive of 
the University of Connecticut Library System in Storrs, Connecticut. 
Olson's early academic interests centred on Herman Melville and Moby Dick; the 
title of his Master's thesis was "The Growth ofHerman Melville, Prose Writer and Poetic 
Thinker." During his PhD program at Harvard, Olson decided not to submit his 
dissertation although it became the basis for his first major publication, Call Me Ishmael, 
subsequently published in 1947. In 1949, Olson received a Guggenheim Fellowship for his 
work on Melville and published a collection of poetry, entitled Y & X This publication led 
to an invitation to join the avant-garde Black Mountain College as theatre program 
director in 1949. Olson would eventually become the College Rector from 1951-1956, 
and it is through his stint at Black Mountain that he came to be a major influence upon a 
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whole generation of American avant-garde writers. The year following Y & X, Olson 
published "Projective Verse," which "called everything to order'' (Duncan 515) for what 
would become known as American postmodern poetry. This work focussed the raw 
energies of the new avant-garde poetry around "the line ofPound and Williams" (Allen 
and Butterick 10) instead of Eliot and Auden. From 1950 until his death in 1970, Olson 
wrote an interesting series of polemical essays and participated in numerous interviews, the 
most notable of which are collected in Human Universe, Muthologos, and The Special 
View of History. In addition to these essays and interviews, there are also over a hundred 
shorter poems in The Collected Poems of Charles Olson: Excluding the Maximus Poems, 
and one major long poem in the tradition of Walt Whitman's Leaves of Grass and Ezra 
Pound's Cantos, consisting of over six hundred pages. This major work, known as The 
Maximus Poems or more commonly, Maximus, contains seven separate books of poems, 
published while Olson was alive (Maximus I, II, Ill) and posthumously (Maximus IV, V, 
VI, and Maximus Vol. 3). 
A characteristic of Olson's writing, whether prose or poetry, is his technique of 
imparting as much of his vast and eclectic knowledge into his work as possible. However, 
much of what he includes is referred to in a passing and often esoteric manner, as if he 
assumed the reader would be acquainted with his many diverse areas of knowledge. 
Although allusion is a common modernist poetic practice, one can find fault in Olson's 
tendency to complicate his argument. However, one must realize that much of this 
difficulty arises from his idiosyncratic tendency to quote directly from his personal 
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conversations, and from his insertion of remote factual data on various and very specific 
areas of history, grammar, philosophy, and science into his poetry and prose. Moreover, 
Olson rarely documents his sources, and when he does they are not always entirely 
accurate. Thanks primarily to the dedicated work of the late George F. Butterick, and to a 
lesser extent Donald Allen,1 it is now possible to trace a vast amount of Olson's sources. 
Regardless of his deliberate avoidance of documenting, one can view Olson as an 
American writer who rejected elements ofWestem- particularly American- civilization 
that he felt were innately wrong, but his relationship to the American tradition is much 
more complicated than this, lying at the heart of his position in the epistemic break 
between the modem and the postmodem. 
1.2 Charles Olson and the (Post)Modem Episteme 
Charles Olson stands at an interesting point in American literary history, beginning 
his public career in 1950, with the publication of"Projective Verse," and thereafter 
becoming the first significant figure of American postmodem poetry. However, Olson's 
designation as a postmodem figure must be seen in a new and different way than has been 
established thus far in Olson criticism. Often, when critics discuss Olson's postmodernist 
tendencies they do so by positing the idea that the modem period, generally acknowledged 
1See George F. Butterick'sA Guide to the Maximus Poems of Charles Olson (Berkeley: 
University ofCalifomiaPress, 1978), and also the notes to Collected Prose: Charles 
Olson, ed. Donald Allen and Benjamin Friedlander (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997). 
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as falling between 1890-1945, and the postmodem period, 1945 to the present, are two 
distinct and separate spatio-temporal spheres of knowledge (Butterick, ''Postmodem" 4). 
These studies posit the notion that the two time frames are more like two monoliths that 
have little connection to one another except that one, the modern, gave rise to and 
necessitated the birth of the other, the postmodem. It is as if all the components that 
created the modem period stopped at the moment the postmodem period replaced it. 
However, divisions in aesthetic approaches to literature, philosophy, and culture in general 
are often more arbitrary in nature than the distinction between the terms "modem" and 
"postmodem" represent. In this view of criticism Olson has been seen as either an anti-
modernist, a figure who ushered in the death of the modem tradition, as in Paul Bove's 
Heideggerean treatment of Olson in Destructive Poetics: Heidegger and Modem 
American Poetry (1980), or, conversely, Olson has been described as an inferior imitator 
of major modernist figures, such as Pound and Wtlliams, as in Matjorie Perloff' s "Charles 
Olson and the Inferior Predecessors: 'Projective Verse' Revisited," and, most infamously, 
James Dickey's section on Olson in Babel to Byzantium: Poets & Poetry Now (1979). 
Unfortunately, Olson is often presented as either a radical American poet and thinker or as 
an insignificant imitator. I argue in this thesis that Charles Olson's place within the 
American poetic tradition is more precarious than simply being either an imitator of a 
certain type of modernity or a catalyst for a radical postmodernity. In pursuing this course 
of inquiry, I intend to establish a greater realization of the dynamic nature ofpostmodem 
American avant-garde poetry, with Olson as an example. The figure of Charles Olson and 
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his position within the American poetic tradition become more visibly problematic than has 
previously been acknowledged in studies of American postmodem poetry generally, and in 
the criticism that deals with Charles Olson particularly. 
Charles Olson's problematical position within American literary history is best 
understood through a reevaluation of Olson's position as nexus between the modem and 
the postmodem periods. Instead of seeing the modem as a separate totality from the 
postmodern, we should understand the division of these two entities in terms of Michel 
Foucault's conception of the episteme. Here, the boundaries between the underlying set of 
rules that govern the discourse of the modem episteme and the postmodem episteme 
become less a solid foundation or "given" for placing Olson neatly within the American 
literary tradition than the polemical separation that these terms actually imply. 
In The Order of Things (1970) and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), 
Foucault questions the foundations of our Western conception of knowledge. In order to 
analyse our epistemological tradition, Foucault directs his attention to how the discourse 
that contributed to certain modes of thought became accepted as "true," such as Platonic 
conceptions of epistemology, and then was unquestioningly disseminated as such. 
Foucault criticizes how, for example, an ancient Greek philosopher like Plato became the 
dominant figure in the philosophical tradition as opposed to the more marginalised figures 
ofHeraclitus or even Parmenides. Foucault questions how and why certain figures 
became accepted and others did not. For him, the matter requires an investigation of the 
history surrounding the discursive structures of our knowledge. In The Archaeology of 
Knowledge Foucault describes the knowledge tradition we have come to blindly accept as 
the 
history of those shady philosophies that haunt literature, art, the sciences, law, 
ethics and even man's daily life; the history of those age-old themes that are never 
crystalized in a rigorous and individual system, but which have formed the 
spontaneous philosophy of those who did not philosophize . . . . The analysis of 
opinions rather than of knowledge, of errors rather than of truth, of types of 
mentality rather than forms of thought 
(Foucault 136-7). 
Foucault's "archeological method" of inquiry seeks to expose the "shady philosophies" 
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that "haunt" the history of knowledge; Olson's own investigations into areas such as Hopi 
language, Mayan hieroglyphs, Whitehead, non-Euclidean geometry, and pre-Socratic 
philosophy, seem to mirror Foucault's archaeological method, particularly in his desire to 
uncover thought structures and cultures that have been covered over by the dominance of 
western culture and Greek philosophy. 
Just as Foucault was searching for alternate methods to accepted structures of 
knowledge, so was Olson. In his essay entitled "The Poet as Archaeologist: Archeologist 
ofMorning," Matthew Corrigan describes Olson's archaeological method as a search for 
"origins oflife and language" that existed before "Logos got hold of the mind and twisted 
it out of the context of the body ... ; a state where language and event are coincident ... ; 
where speech (syntax) names things, gives way to the actual knots and hesitancies of 
experience ... "(273). Corrigan is describing Olson's investigation of what Foucault 
would see as events in the history ofknowledge that came to form part of a period's 
episteme. An episteme, in Foucault's use of the term, becomes the "epistemological field" 
governing the "sets of discursive structures as a whole within which a culture thinks" in a 
given period (Foucault, The Order of Things xxiii; Mills 56; Sheridan 209). 
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The notion of episteme was not foreign to Olson. In fact, in his "Review of Eric A. 
Havelock's Preface to Plato," Olson describes the advance of post-Socratic philosophy as 
being "false" and "invented" (Collected Prose 355-58). More important to Olson is 
Plato's objection to the poetry ofHomer and Hesiod, which was intentionally done "in 
order [to] better himself [and to] support his own invention of another episteme, of his 
belief in a dialectic of Socrates' order ... "(355). The term episteme is Greek for 
''understanding," "knowledge," "science" (456). In the editor's notes to Collected Prose: 
Charles Olson (1997), Donald Allen and Benjamin Friedlander trace Olson's view of the 
term to a recorded interview from 1963 entitled "Under the Mushroom," which was 
subsequently collected in Muthologos I, a collection of interviews and essays published in 
1978 (456). Here Olson discusses the word episteme and how it came to be epistemology 
or "[h]ow do you know. Or the belief that we- that there is knowing. And it was 
invented by a man named Plato. Episteme is his invention and it's one of the most 
dangerous things in the world - is the idea that there is such a thing as knowledge" 
(Muthologos 1: 29). Olson and Foucault both question the givenness of the term 
episteme, but Foucault accepts the term as an arbitrary designation of the thought 
structures - and the discourse that created these thought structures - that contributed to a 
certain period of knowledge, which we now designate as "Classical," "Renaissance," 
"Modern," and even "Postmodern." 
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A main point that Foucault insists upon in his archaeological investigation of 
knowledge is that when one discursive fonnation [such as the modem episteme] gives way 
to another [such as the postmodem] completely new objects, concepts, and theoretical 
choices do not necessarily appear. To the contrary "a number of elements remain 
unchanged" and become part of the new discursive fonnations that characterize the 
episteme (Sheridan 109). When one episteme gives way to another the latter is not 
necessarily a completely "new'' entity. However, what does occur in the transition from 
one episteme to another is known as an epistemic break or rupture. And it is in this light 
that we should consider Charles Olson's "postmodem advance" (Butterick, ''Postmodern" 
4). When Olson's most famous essay "Projective Verse" was published in 1950 the 
modem episteme did not simply evaporate without a trace. Elements of the modem were 
carried over into Olson's poetics, but in such a way that his reformulation of these 
concepts became uniquely postmodem. 
Much ofFoucault's concept of the epistemic break can be traced back to his 
philosophy teachers, Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilheim. Bachelard' s study in 
the history of science led him to the idea that epistemological breaks, or epistemic breaks 
in Foucault's synthesis ofBachelard's thought, do not just simply mark the rejection of 
past thought structures, but also preserve these structures through their reformulation into 
a new and broader context. More precisely, the discursive structures of the previous 
episteme are "replaced by generalizations that reject them as unconditionally correct but 
preserve them as correct under certain restricted conditions" (Gutting 20). There are 
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similarities to Pound and Williams in Charles Olson's poetics; these notions of modernity 
(which will be dealt with in greater detail later in this chapter) are what can be seen as 
being "preserved under restricted conditions" in Olson's poetry (Gutting 20). Olson does 
not, however, accept all ofPound's notions of the poetic, nor does he accept all of 
Williams', but similarities do exist. Olson is not simply walking in the footsteps ofPound 
and Williams. Olson is not entirely derivative of his influences, as Perloff and Dickey 
would lead us to believe, but he was influenced by them. To say that Olson was entirely 
derivative would be like saying that the postmodern is entirely derivative of the modem 
In his The Postmodem Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1984), a seminal 
investigation of the concepts that define postmodernism, Jean-Francois Lyotard describes 
the postmodem in duplicitous terms. The postmodem writer, he says, does not create a 
work governed by the principle that preestablished rules exist (Lyotard 81). Rather, 
familiar categories of the modem or the known are thrown out in favour of new rules and 
categories, and these new '"rules"' determine the work's postmodem nature. In other 
words, ''the artist and the writer, then, are working without rules in order to formulate the 
rules ... " (Lyotard 81). Lyotard does not see postmodernism as the "end" of modernism, 
but as the birth or "nascent state" of what is truly modem (79). Postmodem poetry is 
more than the continuation of modem poetry: postmodem poetry is characterized by a 
"new formal and syntactic flexibility'' that signifies a new attitude toward selt: mind, 
nature, society, and the "inherited assumptions" of modernity (Allen and Butterick 12). 
One can see T. S. Eliot's use of Tradition, as an acceptance of the necessity for the 
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givenness of tradition in the construction of poetry. Eliot does not see the possibility of an 
individual identity or even meaning without Tradition. In his famous 1919 essay 
"Tradition and the Individual Talent," Eliot even goes so far as to say that one can be 
imprisoned by the lack of tradition, and so one must therefore acquire it by working 
diligently toward incorporating it within one's work (Fredman 10). Clearly, Eliot does not 
easily fit into the Lyotardian definition of postmodern as inventing new rules that do not 
necessarily agree or cohere with the modem tradition (Lyotard 80). Abandoning the 
modernist notion that accepts certain elements of tradition, such as the New Critics who 
followed in Eliot's path, the postmodern prefers "formal freedom or openness as opposed 
to academic, formalistic, strictly rhymed and metered verse" (Allen and Butterick 9). 
Olson prefers these postmodem notions of poetry to Eliot's "scholastic mind" (Olson, 
Selected Writings 26). However, Olson unabashedly favours the work ofPound and 
Williams, two decidedly modernist poets, in the same essay that he disparages Eliot and 
the New Critics (15). In comparison with Eliot, Olson appears to be postmodern, but does 
his alignment with Pound and Williams contradict his position as a postmodem writer who 
formulates new rules of writing? 
It would be useful at this point in the discussion to look at Olson's role in the 
epistemic break that occurred in American poetry after World War Two. In her book 
Discourse (1997), Sara Mills correctly recognizes that in Foucault's conception of 
discursive structures there are periodic and chaotically random "discontinuous 
developments" within the discursive structure of the episteme (Mills 58). However, when 
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she goes on to describe the "discontinuity of discourse" that occurs at the moment(s) of 
the epistemic break (there is often more than one single event that signals the end of one 
episteme and the beginning of another) she oversimplifies the dynamism that Foucault's 
conception contains. When Mills says that "in fact intellectual history should be seen as 
simply a series of lurches from one system of classification and representation to another" 
(59) she is blindly accepting an overtly simplistic notion of the episteme as a neat 
monolithic entity that seamlessly morphs into the next. The discursive evolutions that 
characterize an epistemic break are non-linear, and are therefore more like the violent 
smashing of atoms that randomly combine continuities from the old and the new. This 
concept may be better viewed through the works of contemporaries ofFoucault, 
particularly Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. 
In their work What is Philosophy? (1994) Deleuze and Guattari describe the 
concept of a thing or "monument" becoming other while remaining the same due to its 
constant future-oriented nature (164, 175-7). This paradoxical concept is explained 
through the example of Herman Melville's novel Moby Dick, where Ahab, in his obsessive 
quest to destroy the white whale, actually becomes more and more like the whale itself, 
until he is eventually destroyed by his own obsession to possess or become, from a 
Deleuzean standpoint, the white whale. In Ahab's orientation toward the future 
destruction ofMoby Dick he is "becoming-whale" but he still maintains his own "Ahab-
ness" during the pursuit that concludes with his ultimate demise. In philosophical terms 
this example of becoming other while remaining the same is similar to Bachelard's and 
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Canguilheim's epistemological break within the history of the development of knowledge, 
where the break in a particular method of inquiry signalled a "new'' thought-structure that 
synthesized features of the previous method, as well as completely new ones, into a 
coherent, "new'' form: thus becoming other while remaining the same. Therefore, in terms 
of the delimitation between the modem and postmodem, the modem episteme became the 
postmodem episteme while retaining similarities that belong to both. What matters is not 
that modem concepts exist in the postmodern, but haw they are used by postmodemity. In 
the next section I consider how Olson synthesized these notions of the modem and the 
postmodem to develop postmodem, projective verse. 
It is, ultimately, not fair to Olson's project to represent him simply as a derivation 
of another poet or group of poets that preceded him. This kind of naive criticism only sees 
temporality and ideas in a linear fashion. The breath and scope of Olson's work is too vast 
and diverse to treat him so simplistically. The complexity of his work and his position in 
the transition from the modem to the postmodem is also too complicated to discuss Olson 
as belonging to one side of history or another. Olson is not either a holdover from the 
modem period (like Robert Lowell, for example) or a postmodernist. He is, however, 
postmodem in that Lyotardian sense: Olson signifies the beginning of a modernism that is 
not dependent upon previous movements as modem writers and poets like Eliot were. 
However, Olson's postmodemism, like the episteme it partakes in, is complicated and even 
at times paradoxical. Olson's postmodemism is not principally governed by preestablished 
rules but is instead a search for new rules of poetry and thought. This search can be 
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clearly seen in his poetry and prose, particularly in its appearance and content. In order to 
grasp the significance of Charles Olson in relation to the American literary tradition one 
must begin with an analysis of how he arrived at his poetics. This process necessarily 
includes the poets and thinkers who influenced Olson's own thought, as well as the 
criticism that has critiqued the nature of these influences on his work. 
1.3 Olson and American Literature 
Despite what one critic has referred to as Olson's poetry being similar to 
"Whitmanesque prose," there has been very little written on Olson's poetic connections to 
Walt Whitman (Corrigan 275). In terms of their shared sense of the spoken or oral 
orientation of their work, open form poetic style, and the ambiguous presence of their 
poetic personae (Whitman's cosmic "f' and Olson's Maximus) Whitman and Olson can be 
said to share many poetic techniques. However, there is simply not enough space in this 
thesis to argue their poetic congruency effectively, especially considering their experiments 
with the American long poem. Interestingly, there have been several studies on Olson's 
affinity with predominantly prose oriented writers from the nineteenth century, such as 
Stephen Fredman's Thoreauvian analysis of Olson in The Grounding of American Poetry: 
Charles Olson and the Emersonian Tradition (1993) and Edward Halsey Foster's 
Understanding Black Mountain Poets (1995), which also casts Olson and his 
contemporaries, Robert Creeley and Robert Duncan, in an Emersonian-transcendentalist 
light. 
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Although the influence of Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman on later American 
writers cannot be understated, the most important nineteenth century influence in 
American literature on Olson's aesthetic was Herman Melville and his Moby Dick. As 
mentioned, Olson wrote his Master's thesis on Melville, and his first major work, Call Me 
Ishmael (1947), was based on his unsubmitted Doctoral thesis. Not much noteworthy 
work has been done on the earliest of Olson's works. However, the main thrust of Paul 
Christensen's Charles Olson: Call Him Ishmael (1979) is aimed at reading Olson's later 
essays and poetry through the conceptions of space that Olson posits in Call Me Ishmael. 
Olson begins Call Me Ishmael with the declaration that he "take[s] SPACE to be the 
central fact to man born in America, from Folsom cave to now. I spell it large because it 
comes large here. Large, and without mercy'' (Collected Prose 17). Indeed, Olson feels 
that "it is geography .... [t]hat made the first American story ... "(17). Christensen 
conducts a very thorough investigation on the importance of Moby Dick's influence on 
Olson's thought, particularly Olson's conception of space, and the significance Melville's 
novel holds for the concepts he was later to develop in essays such as "Projective Verse," 
and more obviously in the collection Human Universe (1967). However, the study 
focuses too much on aligning Olson's concept of space, particularly the ideas of the way 
westward expansion formulated a certain American conception of the spatio-temporal 
realm and man's relationship to it, to the formal appearance of Olson's projective poetry. 
For example, Christensen discusses the positioning of Olson's verse in terms of a tension 
of movement along vertical and horizontal axes. Of the movement he says "[l]ike a 
staircase, these strophes move simultaneously down and across the page as the thought 
tends toward deeper introspection in an effort to resolve the conflict within the thought" 
(Christensen, notes between 112-3). 
16 
This is an interesting approach to Olson's prosodic positioning. However, it is 
highly doubtful that Olson formulated his poetics this way, especially not in "an effort to 
resolve the conflict" of his thought. Olson created his poetry according to "composition 
by field" which attempted to preserve the unresolved tension of open form poetry. In 
"Projective Verse," Olson says "[t]he objects which occur at every given moment of 
composition [of the poem] ... [must be] made to hold, and to hold exactly inside the 
content and the context of the poem ... " (Selected Writings 30). Furthermore, for Olson 
and other postmodem poets, particularly his fellow Black Mountain poet and friend Robert 
Creeley, the form that the content of the poem takes is not as important as the content 
itself To resolve the "tension" of the content of the poem, as Christensen implies, would 
result in a "closing" of Olson's poetic aim, and this is too similar to the formalist poetry 
under review by the New Critics. Unfortunately, this is an error that Christensen himself 
cannot avoid making. Olson never intentionally "closes" or resolves the content of his 
poetry in the manner ofNew Critical formalism as simplistically as Christensen depicts. 
Olson's poetry is much more self-consciously hermeneneutical than that. 
The historical time period in which Olson was writing puts him in a transitional 
state between two eras - he is not entirely modem or completely postmodem in his poetic 
orientation. Moreover, the concept or notion of an American tradition is itself open to 
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critique. In the way that Olson is both postmodem and, in certain ways, modem, his 
rebellion against tradition is a common feature of a strong anti-traditionalism present in the 
foundations of the American tradition. For example, in The Gruunding of American 
Poetry, Fredman asserts that this anti-traditionalism is built into the fabric of the American 
idea itself. America embodies a "spirit of anti-traditionalism" because it generally distrusts 
''tradition" and "authority," partly because of its strong belief in the values of"freedom 
and independence" (8). This ideological standpoint results in the sacrifice of the 
"supportive function that foundational myths supply'' (8). As a result, American poets 
often face the need to create their own idiosyncratic foundation from which to speak. 
The question of groundlessness has always been a part of the American literary 
tradition. After the Revolutionary War, America, and in tum American literature, 
renounced their ties to Europe. Furthermore, American literature has always been visibly 
different in its orientation from its European counterparts, particularly since the nineteenth 
century. This can easily be seen by comparing a poem from Whitman's Leaves of Grass to 
a poem by his historical contemporary Robert Browning. The need for American writers 
to cultivate their own ground, particularly since the nineteenth century, and continuing in 
an even more radical fashion to the present, is a symptom of the "postmodem condition" 
that Lyotard describes as ''working without rules in order to formulate the rules" (81 ). 
The preference for formal freedom and the desire to be free from a constraining tradition is 
a strong part of the American identity. 
InA Quick Graph (1970), Robert Creeley, Olson's closest intellectual supporter 
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and partner in the postmodem projective verse project, describes the groundlessness that 
American poets must face in order to create their art. American poets "perhaps more than 
any group of people upon the earth at this moment, have had to imagine and thereby to 
make that reality which they are then given to live in. It is as though they had to realize 
the world anew'' ( 65). Creeley' s view is actually a major theme of the American tradition 
itself. Indeed, each successive generation of American poets has always sought to see the 
world in a new light. Creeley' s desire to "realize the world anew'' has ingrained itself as 
the "central preoccupation of American poetry" (Fredman 3). Fredman uses the figures of 
William Carlos Williams and T. S. Eliot to illustrate the complexity that surrounds the 
issue of American poets' acceptance or denial of tradition. Because of the dual nature of 
American tradition, it is as common to accept a formulation of the tradition as it is to deny 
that one exists. William Carlos Williams's conception of the tradition and Eliot's 
conception of the tradition are both "revisionary" in their approach (Fredman 17). 
However, Williams' revision consists of an emphasis on the personal rewriting of the 
tradition based on the idea ofEmersonian self-reliance whereas Eliot finds the 
groundlessness of American tradition imprisoning, and so advocates acquiring the ground 
of tradition through diligent synthesis of other traditions. 
As with Eliot's presentation of tradition in "Tradition and the Individual Talent," 
William Carlos Williams in his In the American Grain defends the individual construction 
of a poetic ground or foundation. However, Williams is not interested in previously 
established notions of anything: ''No opinion can be trusted; even facts may be nothing but 
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a printer's error .... If we cannot make a man live again when he is gone, it is boorish to 
imprison him dead within some narrow definition .... It's lies, such history, and 
dangerous. Just there may lie our hope for the future, beneath that stone of predjudice" 
(In the American Grain 190). Just because a writer or idea once existed before this does 
not mean that each successive generation of writers should ignore the past. Rather, like 
Eliot, the writer or idea exists, in Williams' conception, as a building block or inspiration 
for a new writer's formulation of his or her own ground. Wtlliams saw much of himself in 
the way Poe attempted to "clear the GROUND" of American tradition from literary 
colonialism (In The American Grain 216). For both Williams and Eliot, the past exists in 
order to be used or ignored, but not to be imitated; literary history, even American literary 
history, is not there as a repository of ideological stagnancy. 
This notion that Williams expounds in In The American Grain is what Philip 
Kuberski refers to as a "recurrent pattern in American culture"; it is a pattern that attempts 
to find "authenticity'' and "establish a new discourse as an old one" by confirming that 
change is "a return to the oldest truths" (175). Kuberski sees American literature as 
containing both a "radically 'wild"' and "mythic" "double vision" that inscribes each 
successive generation of American writers (175). Kuberski's conception of the American 
literary tradition explains why a writer such as Charles Olson can be seen as being 
simultaneously a radical wild "other" within a new movement in American poetry and 
"deeply traditional" in his "classic American revolt against the formalist poetry of the New 
Critical poets who created a style that concentrated on the seventeenth-century aspects of 
20 
Eliot's and Pound's poetry ... " (Kuberski 178). Although Kuberski recognises the 
doubleness that is essential to the ideology of the American grounding of tradition, he does 
not actually retain this doubleness in his depiction of Olson's poetics. He too falls victim 
to the "derivative" school of Olson critics, with statements like this: "like Pound's, 
Olson's poetics are conservative documents" (186). Kuberski's error lies in his 
misconception of the "conservative" character of Olson's poetics. Olson is not 
"conservative" in the way that Eliot is in regard to tradition, where "conservativism" is 
seen as a dissatisfaction with (post )modernity's "radical rejection of the authority of 
tradition" (Fredman 19). Olson's poetry and prose may inscribe itself in a "field of old 
texts" but only in the same manner that "an archaeologist might open up a site" (Riddel 
179). Olson's purpose in using Pound and Williams as foundations for his own poetic 
ground is not in order to "sanctify old texts or uncover their origin" like New Critical 
poets, but rather to "decipher the crux that led to their writing" (Riddel 184). We can see 
that by continuing with the metaphor of archaeology, and relating it to the 
"archaeological" method of Michel Foucault, Olson is investigating how and in what form 
modem discursive structures can take part in the emergence, insertion, and functioning of 
his own poetics within the American tradition. Olson's use o( and similarity to, his 
modem predecessors shows how he used a method more akin to the "archaeology" of 
Foucault than to imitation. Olson's dynamic synthesis of the American tradition of anti-
traditionalism places him on a shifting and fluctuating ground. He is at once part of the 
Williams strain of the tradition and a part from it. Just as the American tradition seems to 
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be rooted in a notion of always becoming "new," so must Olson become "new." To what 
extent does Olson differ from the modernists in order to achieve his "new'' formulation of 
American poetry? 
When the New Critics advocated the authenticity of adhering to a tradition they 
essentially accepted a conservative approach to the classical tradition. Although Ezra 
Pound's poems often take the appearance of an "avant-garde" or "non-traditional" form, 
as in The Cantos, they still rely heavily on what Charles Doria refers to as two "ordinary 
classical forms," the "encyclopedia" and the "lyric'' (Doria 134). Doria goes on to say that 
Olson's use of the classical tradition was the "opposite" ofPound's because Olson was 
much more willing to "challenge," "discredit," and "remove" it as "an institutional 
roadblock" (134-35). Doria is likely right in this assertion. For example, a common theme 
of Olson's poetry is his violent criticism of Socratic epistemological discourse: "the Greeks 
appear to have invented [a discourse] that has hugely intermit[ ted] our participation in our 
own experience, and so prevent[s] discovery'' (Selected Writings 54). Olson is also highly 
critical of what most would view as traditional notions of poetical composition, such as 
rhyme scheme and metre: "[i]t would do no harm, as an act of contention to both prose 
and verse as now written, if both rime and meter, and, in the quantity of words, both sense 
and sound, were less in the forefront of the mind than the syllable .. . "(Selected Writings 
18). For Doria, Olson's reliance upon Pound as a poetical influence was mostly in 
providing an example for his own positioning within American literature. Robert Duncan, 
the third most influential Black Mountain poet along with Olson and Creeley, would agree 
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with this statement, "Toward the end Charles saw where [the postmodem poetic 
movement] was, but initially he wanted to be like Ezra Pound, a mover; and he was a 
mover, of course .... projective verse really called us" (Duncan 517, italics added). 
Although it is now "commonplace" for literary historians to see Olson as part of the 
Pound-Williams line, due, no doubt, in part to Olson's own admonition of them in his 
poetry and prose (Selected Writings 15 and Collected Poems 172), Olson had suspicions 
about the "advance in discourse which Pound and Williams ... led the rest of us on to" 
(Human Universe 63). It is these suspicions that led Olson to acquire his own poetic 
identity through projective verse. 
Arguably the most important thing Olson took from Ezra Pound was not directly 
from Pound's own poetics but from the poetics of Ernest Fenellosa's The Chinese Written 
Character as a Medium for Poetry, which Pound edited. It is from Pound's version of 
Fenellosa that Olson arrived at an important notion of his projective verse: the kinetics or 
energy of verse. In Fenellosa's work, Olson read concepts of the latent force behind 
words. Statements such as "one action in nature promotes another; thus the agent and the 
object are secretly verbs"; "[t]he transferrence of force from agent to object ... occupy 
time. Therefore, a reproduction of them in imagination requires the same temporal order"; 
and most importantly, "[t]he sentence form was forced upon primitive men by nature itself 
.... [a ]11 truth has to be expressed in sentences because all truth is the transference of 
power. The type of sentence in nature is a flash of lightning" (Fenellosa 29, 7, 12). The 
presence ofFenellosa rather than Pound is more blatantly manifested in Olson's most 
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famous piece, "Projective Verse": "the kinetics of the thing. A poem is energy transferred 
from where the poet got it .... the poem itself must, at all points, be an energy-discharge . 
. . . yet an energy which is peculiar to verse alone" (Selected Writings 16). In his "La 
Torre," Olson's verse is clearly rooted in Fenollosa: 
To begin again. Lightning 
is an axe, transfer 
of force subject to object is 
order: destroy! 
To destroy 
is to start again, is a factor of 
sun, fire is 
When the sun is out, dowsed 
(Collected Poems 189) 
This is obviously quite different in appearance and tone from one ofPound's more "avant-
garde" passages from the Cantos. For example "Canto 95": 
Benton: when there was plenty of metal 
Van Buren already desmearing Talleyrand 
J.A. "the whole people (devaluation)." 
Leukos Leukothoe 
White foam, a sea-gull 
(Pound, Cantos 644) 
Although the appearance ofPound's poem is more "postmodem" than other poems in the 
New Critical inventory, it does not contain the revolutionary avant-garde message that 
Olson's "La Torre" does. "La Torre" is an overt call to remove the "institutional 
roadblock" that the classical tradition became for poets like Eliot and Pound (Doria 135). 
Olson is violently asserting the destruction of a teleological grounding for his poetics. The 
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tower of tradition must be broken so that new poetic formulations can arise. Olson is 
advocating the destruction of preestablished rules so that he can establish new rules for 
creating poetry. He is clearing the ground of an American literary tradition for himself in a 
way that cannot be dismissed as derivative ofPound. 
Although, understandably, much has been written about the affinities between 
Pound and Olson, it is helpful to consider how Olson's synthesis ofFenellosa actually 
moved him away from being what some have termed derivative of Pound. There are also 
obvious links between Olson and Williams, but much of this can be related to their shared 
approach to the American literary Tradition. Perhaps the most obvious presence of 
Williams in Olson's poetics is Olson's internalization ofWilliams' dictum "no ideas but in 
things" (Paterson 6). Olson's formulation of this concept can be seen in his attack upon 
Eliot. Olson criticized Eliot's reliance upon over-intellectualization of images and 
concepts within his poetry, but Olson's poetry can also be accused of possessing this trait. 
In light of Harold Bloom's Anxiety of Influence (1973), it can be said that Olson's anxiety 
over the enormous influence of Eliot upon modem literature forced Olson to divorce 
himself from Eliot in order to establish his originality within American (post)modem 
literature. At this point in the discussion it would be useful to compare excerpts from 
Eliot's The Wasteland to Olson's "Kingfishers" in order to see their similarities: 
What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow 
Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man, 
You cannot say or guess, for you know only 
A heap of broken images, where the sun beats, 
And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief: 
And the dry stone no sound of water. 
I will show you fear in a handful of dust. 
Frisch weht der Wind 
Der Heimat zu 
Mein frisch Kind, 
Wo wei/est du? 
"You gave me hyacinths first a year ago; 
"They called me the hyacinth girl." 
Looking into the heart of light, the silence. 
Oed' und leer das Meer. 
(Eliot, The Wasteland and other Writings 39) 
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Eliot juxtaposes images without any apparent logical continuity between the poem's dense 
imagery and disjointed content, whether expressed in familiar or unfamiliar language. 
Olson also relies upon these disassociative techniques in "The Kingfishers," but he is more 
conscious in his refusal to adhere to the left-hand margin as a foundation in the positioning 
of his verse: 
I thought of the E on the stone, and of what Mao said 
la lumiere" 
but the kingfisher 
de 1' aurore" 
but the kingfisher flew west 
est devant nous! 
he got the color of his breast 
from the heat of the setting sun! 
But not these things were the factors. Not the birds. 
The legends are 
legends. Dead, hung up indoors, the kingfisher 
will not indicate a favoring wind, 
or avert the thunderbolt. 
Mao concluded: 
26 
nous devons 
nous lever 
et agir! 
(Olson, Collected Poems 87) 
Although at a glance Olson's poetry does not seem so strikingly different :from Eliot's 
poetry, it should be realized that Olson was reacting to his anxiety over Eliot's enormous 
influence on modem literature. Indeed, Olson would view Eliot's poetry as too divorced 
:from its own images. For Olson, Eliot's problem is that his poetry is too rooted in the 
ego-centric conception of mind to be projective: ''Eliot is not projective. . . . it could be 
argued that it is because Eliot has stayed inside the non-projective that he fails ... " 
(Selected Writings 26). Olson intentionally contests Eliot in order to render him less 
intimidating, and, as a result, Olson commits what Bloom calls an act of misprision, a 
misreading of past poets that results in the young or "new'' poet's non-derivative voice 
(Anxiety 30). Although more akin to Pound than Eliot, Olson also derides Pound for his 
ego-centred poetry: "Ez's epic solves problems by his ego .. . "(Selected Writings 5) and 
"so much ofEz is, the 19th century [ego] stance" (83). However, in his critique ofNew 
Critical poetry Olson often avoids direct attacks upon Pound in favour of Eliot, and 
Olson's aversion to Eliot often becomes a theme for his poetry as well as his prose. 
Moreover, Olson's disagreement with Eliot and his favouring of Pound and Williams is 
actually more a difference of degree than of kind. In "ABCs" Olson states the position of 
the projectivist, contrasting it with what he sees as Eliot's overt scholasticism: 
Words, form 
but the extension of 
content 
Style, est verbum 
The word 
is image, and the reverend reverse is 
Eliot 
(Collected Poems 172) 
Much of Olson's criticism ofEliot stems from what Olson would see as Eliot's 
conservative synthesis of the American tradition. In "La Preface" Olson sees the dead 
figures of tradition that always stand in the way of creating the new. The dead poets 
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cannot be relied upon for the creation of a new verse. Much like Emerson's "imitation is 
suicide," Olson feels that it is unwise to imitate "dead" poets. In "La Preface" Olson 
phrases this notion as "the dead bury the dead, I and it is not very interesting" (Collected 
Poems 47). illtimately, the postmodem is "born not of the buried" poets; even the 
"unburied dead," such as those of the Eliot line, must be rebelled against (47). Olson 
arrived at this stance early in his poetic career. In addition to his attack on Eliot in 1950's 
''Projective Verse," at the height ofEliot's fame in 1953, Olson declared him and other 
poets like him "a dead end in the development of modem literature" (Faas, Towards a New 
American Poetics 40). 
1.4 Whitehead, Objectivism, and Olson's Reevaluation of the Subject-Object 
Dichotomy 
Besides his obvious rebellion against the New Critics, a move by which many 
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postmodem poets can be characterized, 2 one of Charles Olson's definitive breaks with his 
modernist influences centres on his conception of the ego-position and its presence within 
the poem. In a letter written to Robert Creeley on March 8, 1951, while Olson was 
studying Mayan hieroglyphs in Lerma, Mexico, he discusses his struggle to find a unifying 
principle for the poetic epistemology he was developing as a "stance toward reality" 
(Selected Writings 15). This would act as a natural philosophical extension of the 
postmodem projective poetic style he first discussed in "Projective Verse." For Olson this 
"stance" or philosophical position would centre on his reformulation of the concepts 
surrounding the age-old division between what constituted a subject and an object. One of 
Olson's main problems with other modem American poetry was its acceptance of a 
dominance of subject over object. Often this would present itself as the presence of the 
poet's own ego or subjectivity within the poem. Olson refers to this type of subjectivity as 
the presence of an "ego-position" (Selected Writings 24, 83). In his letter to Creeley, 
Olson writes "I am trying to see how to throw the materials I am interested in so that they 
take, with all impact of a correct methodology AND WITH THE ALTERNATIVE TO 
THE EGO-POSITION' (Selected Writings 83). Olson sees a potential model for this in 
Williams' Paterson: ''Bill HAS an emotional system which is capable of extensions & 
comprehensions the ego-system (the Old Deal, Ez as Cento Man, here dates) is not" (83). 
20ther postmodem poets, for example, who also rebelled against the New Critics are 
Robert Creeley, Robert Duncan, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Philip Whelan, Jack Kerouac, 
Allen Ginsberg, Gary Snyder, and Michael McClure. For an interesting collection of these 
and other American postmodem poets see Donald Allen and George F. Butterick' s The 
Postmoderns: The New American Poetry Revisited (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1982). 
However, Williams' limitation of the subject within the poem breaks down over what 
Olson refers to as his "methodology" which "contributes nothing, in fact delays, deters, 
and hampers, by not having busted through the very problem ... " (83). Olson sees 
Williams' failure as due in part to his reliance upon a poetic movement known as 
objectivism. 
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Much of what is known as objectivism in American poetic circles is traceable 
through either "affinity'' or "influence" to the British philosopher Alfred North Whitehead 
(von Hallberg, "Olson, Whitehead, and the Objectivists" 86). Louis Zukofsky is perhaps 
the best known of the objectivist poets, whose main unifying concept was based upon his 
definition of objectivism in the April 1931 edition of Poetry magazine. Here Zukofsky 
described the objectivist position as "objective" and "contextual" because it was based on 
"self-contained" notions of the object that were not oriented subjectively in their nature 
(56). In Whitehead's Process and Reality there is an emphasis on the equality of the 
subject and object, which, because of his notion of process, entails that each entity in 
existence is always in the process of constructing itself as well as simultaneously 
constructing every other entity. For Whitehead, the traditional division between subject 
and object is removed, and consequently the subject loses the importance it had in the 
Classical and Renaissance episteme. Whitehead's philosophy emphasizes the process or 
activity of each entity, which in nature contains no subject-object division. His philosophy 
is one that avoids distinguishing man as the most important entity, and so is anti-
anthrocentric. Whitehead, von Hallberg says, "does all he can to avoid hard and fast 
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distinctions between man and other entities" (103). This is in order to preserve the 
equality of the object and the subject. 
It is clear that Olson was perhaps more familiar with Whitehead's conception of 
objectivism than most poets of his time. Indeed, in 1956 while rector ofBlack Mountain 
College, Olson gave a series oflectures on Whitehead that eventually became collected as 
The Special View of History in 1970. Furthermore, Robert Duncan, in an interview that 
forms part of the introduction of The Special View of History fondly recalls how Olson 
came to give a lecture on Whitehead to the San Francisco Poetry Center in 1957: 
In 1957, the Poetry Center raked up about $200 for Charles to come to San 
Francisco. We had a group of about twenty people and he gave five lectures. 
Charles was presenting Whitehead's Process and Reality .... So in the later part 
of 1956 and 1957, just the period he's also involved in closing out the [Black 
Mountain] school, he was occupied with Process and Reality. After all, it is 
projective verse, it enlarges the idea of field .... 
(The Special View of History 10-11) 
From Olson's copy ofWhitehead's Process and Reality, held in the Olson Library at the 
University of Connecticut, Robert von Hallberg has been able to deduce that Olson was 
reading and writing his own marginalia in the margins, periodically but faithfully from 195 5 
well into the 1960's (86). Furthermore, Olson was also familiar with Whitehead's less 
daunting text Adventures of Ideas from at least 1955, but probably in actuality even earlier 
than this (86). When Olson writes that his new version of objectivism is based upon 
"getting rid of the lyrical interference of the individual as ego, of the 'subject' and his 
soul," and that following this "man is himself an object, whatever he may take to be his 
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advantages" it is easy to see the presence ofWhitehead (Selected Writings 24). However, 
Olson refrains from truly accepting the equality of the subject-object dynamic even though 
he also calls for a ~'humilitas" that would assert an equality between the two (25). Olson 
even goes so far as to use Whitehead's conception of the object as the basis for his own 
new humanism (93). As with the examples of how Olson incorporated American literary 
tradition to create his own poetic space he also uses Whitehead in a similar fashion. 
Although in his essay ''Projective Verse" and continuing through the trajectory of his 
career, from "Human Universe" to The Special View of History, and even the Muthologos 
collection, Olson was arguing for an epistemological shift in the poetic conception of the 
subject-object division, he still retained an anthrocentrism that Whitehead denied. Olson's 
epic Maximus is also peculiar in this instance because it can be read as an extension of his 
own persona, which if he had truly gotten rid of the "ego-position" as he had claimed in 
"Projective Verse," the presence oftheMaximus persona would not be so pervasive. 
Robert Creeley sums up the inherent contradiction in Olson's conception of the subject-
object division by saying that "objectivity is, in intention, the prime aspect of a method 
[objectism] which plans to deal with the 'things around' as characters in themselves .... 
As such, this wish intends as complete a break as possible with the subjective" (Creeley, A 
Quick Graph 18, italics added). Clearly, the intentions of Olson's objectism "belie [the] 
result" (Creeley 18). Although Olson turned to Whitehead as a basis for the development 
of his new postmodem ground for American poetry, it was ultimately his relationship with 
Robert Creeley that allowed Olson to break with his modem influences. 
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1.5 Charles Olson and Robert Creeley: Institutionalizing the Anti-Institutional 
Charles Olson and Robert Creeley' s literary relationship began in 1950 when 
Creeley, a recent Harvard dropout, rejected Olson's poems from inclusion in his newly 
created Lillitz Review because Olson's poems seemed to lack a conviction in their 
language. Immediately following this first interaction a flourishing correspondence 
ensued. It is from this correspondence that Creeley' s Gold Diggers, a collection of short 
stories, and the first section of the For Love poems, as well as Olson's "Projective Verse" 
and ''Human Universe" were formulated. The Creeley-Olson correspondence has been 
collected and edited in nine volumes by George F. Butterick, and this collection only 
contains the first two years of their exchange. The bond that Olson and Creeley formed in 
these years allowed for what would become a major part of the American postmodem 
literary field. In the early fifties there was no audience for their work, and they had 
essentially to invent themselves simultaneously with the audience that would receive their 
work. This relationship can be seen in terms ofBourdieu's literary field and Foucault's 
archaeological analysis, particularly in how Olson and Creeley formed a new discourse of 
the postmodem through intervention into the avant-garde literary field. 
In his The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field (1996), 
Bourdieu sees the cultural field as divided into "large-scale" and "restricted" production; 
the former corresponds to the market of the trade-press publishers, while the latter is more 
akin to the avant-garde, where economic factors are not as important as the critical 
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acceptance of one's group, movement, or peers (142-44). The restricted field of 
production often leads to "anti-institutional institutions" (Bourdieu 258). Charles Olson 
and Robert Creeley invented and advocated their conception of postmodern poetics -
projectivism - through restricted areas of production, such as the small leftist magazines 
Origin, edited by Cid Corman but heavily influenced by Olson and Creeley, and Black 
Mountain Review, which Creeley edited after his Lillitz Review folded. These initially 
small magazines became an essential part of the institution of the postmodern American 
avant-garde. For example, the last edition of Black Mountain Review collected the first 
generation of"Beat" writers like Kerouac and Ginsberg along with members of the Black 
Mountain movement, like Duncan and Olson. The "large-scale" literary production side of 
the literary field acted as an authority of delimitation for Olson and Creeley: the 
conservative press focussed on poets of the New Critical schoo~ and did not actively 
publish avant-garde writers. The avant-garde, which Olson and Creeley were a part of 
because of their shared anti-formalist attitude, had to create the space, or in Foucault's 
terms, the "surface of emergence," for their own brand of poetry (Sheridan 97). 
The division in the literary field can be seen in the publication of two separate 
anthologies of new American poetry in the 1960's. In 1962, Donald Hall and Robert Pack 
edited a publication of"new'' poetry entitled, New Poets of England and America. Hall 
and Pack's compilation is centred on the formalism of the New Criticism. For example, 
William Carlos Williams is excluded from the anthology while Yeats is included, and there 
is an obvious emphasis on common New Critical elements of poetic construction like 
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"rationalis~" "elitism," "learnedness," and the "historical" (Hoover xx:vili). The Hall/Pack 
anthology is formed out of its basis in the "large-scale" cultural field of production. It is 
conservative in its orientation due in part because of its position in the cultural field and 
because of its intended audience. New Poets of England and America is not indicative of 
the emergence of the postmodem episteme that had begun with the publication of Olson's 
"Projective Verse". Donald Allen's The New American Poetry, published two years 
before is the opposite: Allen's anthology favours the "irrational," the "contemporary," and 
the "spontaneity'' of the postmodem American voice (Hoover xx:vili). It also, 
coincidentally includes both poems and prose from Olson, who is also the postmodem 
poet who begins the collection. The New American Poetry collects the avant-garde poets 
that have until that time been subjected to a restricted cultural field of production, and in a 
sense, institutionalizes the anti-institutional. The seeds for the institutionalization of the 
anti-institutional postmodem avant-garde, however, began with the Olson-Creeley 
correspondence. 
The relationship between Olson and Creeley initiated their becoming the "front-
guard" of the postmodem American poetry movement. In order to understand how they 
invented their own surface from which to emerge it is necessary to understand their 
conception of doubleness. In her book Career Moves: Olson, Creeley, Zukofsky, 
Be"igan, and the American Avant-Garde (2000), Libbie Rifkin provides an illuminating 
commentary on the evolution of the Olson-Creeley aesthetic. Shortly into their 
correspondence Olson and Creeley became conscious of the necessary ontological 
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ramifications of their collaboration: they began to see themselves as a "single human 
figure" that was comprised of equally important "complimentary halves" (Rifkin 44). The 
ultimate goal of this "figure" was to disrupt or "decentre"·previous notions of the "ego 
position," while creating a surface for their emergence into an avant-garde literary field 
which did not then exist (Riddell62-3). Olson would comment on the dynamic of this 
single entity as being based on his "root principle" that ''the PERSON accomplishes the 
SINGLE by way of the FACT that experience is always DOUBLE" (Butterick, Guide to 
the Maximus Poems xxxiii). Olson's view of his "root principle" is reminiscent of 
Whitehead's reformulation of the whole-part relationship in philosophy which becomes, in 
Whitehead, the notion of process whereby the single (part), is always simultaneously 
involved in the construction of every other entity (whole). To develop a "single human 
figure" out of"two complimentary halves" is the reification of Olson's concept of process 
that he took from Whitehead. Indeed, Olson dedicated his Maximus poems to Robert 
Creeley, "the Figure of Outward," with the phrase "All my life I've heard I one makes 
many'' (The Maximus Poems, dedication page). Commenting on their collaborative 
process in 1969, Olson writes "otherwise I why was the pt. then to ... write to Creeley I 
daily? To make that whole thing I double" (Butterick Guide to the Maximus Poems 3). 
That is, in other words, to create a larger space for emergence into the literary field 
through collaboration, which in Bourdieu's terminology would be the only mode of 
production available to the restricted production that necessarily characterizes the nature 
of the avant-garde's commodification: acceptance by one's peers. But what was the main 
factor in how the Olson-Creeley collaborative process became a model for the 
institutionalization of the postmodern avant-garde? 
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The main event that institutionalized Olson and Creeley was the publication of 
Olson's ''Projective Verse," which is actually an unwieldy and often disjointed 
amalgamation of modem, soon to become, postmodem, poetical theories. Shortly before 
the publication of the essay, Creeley wrote to Olson complaining of the rejection his story 
"The Unsuccessful Husband" was receiving from publishers at the Kenyon Review (Rifkin 
49; Butterick Complete Correspondence 1:79-81). Probably from the pain of rejection, 
Creeley launches into an attack on the notions of subjectivity that reigned in the publishing 
business. He offers his notion of the "Single Intelligence," an entity that necessarily 
benefits from being free from the demands of the commodification of mind that occurs 
when involved in the "large-scale" production methods of trade-press publishing. Instead 
of having his intelligence commodified by his story's publication in the Kenyon Review, 
Creeley comforts himself with the avant-garde creation ofhis own essence, and the 
"restricted" acceptance of his creation by Olson. ''Breaking down the supposition/ that 
prose & poetry: depend on perhaps counter/ at least 'different' kinds of attitude and 
intelligence" than large scale production of the literary field would accommodate because 
of its emphasis on New Critical conceptions of traditional formalism, Creeley offers instead 
the antithetical, avant-garde view that it would be better to realize that "form is never 
more than an extension of content" (Butterick, Complete Correspondence 1: 78-9). Olson 
would write back to Creeley, excited about this phrase, reprinting it twice in his letter 
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alone, and would insert it as the second principle of"Projective Verse," where it becomes 
the "reason why a projective poem can come into being" (Selected Writings 16). 
"Projective Verse" would achieve a "totemic" status by the ''vigorous circulation of its 
precepts" between Olson and Creeley and their "accumulating company of peers" that 
were unified through small, avant-garde magazines like Origin (Rifkin 51). The 
correspondence between Olson and Creeley led to "Projective Verse" becoming a 
postmodern standard of American literary history. It is through their conception of the 
literary collaboration that they were able to overcome their delimitation by the trade-press 
publishing market. 
1.6 Olson and Black Mountain CoHege 
Although some critics see Olson as merely a continuation ofPound, like Dickey 
and Perloff, the influence ofPound and even Williams was not as important to Olson's 
postmodem poetics as were his collaborative efforts with Creeley. However, Olson did 
not meet Creeley in person until he became rector of the avant-garde Black Mountain 
College and invited Creeley to join the faculty as lecturer in 1954 (Rifkin 45). Black 
Mountain College was another factor in Olson's ascendency in becoming the first 
recognizable American postmodem poet (Butterick, ''Postmodem" 4). In many ways the 
formation of the experimental college mirrors Olson's postmodem push. Black Mountain 
College was founded in 1933 by John Andrew Rice, who was fired from his position as 
professor of classics at Rollins College for his avant-garde theories of education, which 
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were not shared by the Rollins College president (Muthologos 2: 57). Black Mountain 
College was formed from buildings that were initially owned by a religious organization in 
Black Mountain, North Carolina, and the college quickly became an experiment in freedom 
from the bureaucratic policies that characterized mainstream universities. After the 
publication of"Projective Verse," Olson came to the attention of the literary world, and 
this newfound fame coupled with his relationship with Edward Dahlberg, who was rector 
ofBlack Mountain at the time that "Projective Verse" was published, and a mentor to 
Olson while he wrote Call Me Ishmael, resulted in Olson's invitation to become the 
college's next- and last- rector. When Olson became rector in 1951, he essentially acted 
as liaison to the world outside of the college (Foster 2). Although Olson led faculty 
discussions on curriculum and administration, his power, due to the egalitarian nature of 
the college, was no greater than any other faculty member: ''Rector was the title that John 
Rice demanded that the place have for its apparent president" (Jvfuthologos 2: 58, 63; 
Foster 2). Black Mountain had long had a concentration in liberal arts. Painting, dancing, 
music, and literature had all been emphasized at one point or another depending on who 
was rector at the time. When Olson became rector the curriculum became even more 
focussed on the liberal arts, with an obvious emphasis on poetry and literature. 
Olson knew that the novelty ofBlack Mountain was in putting the liberal arts at the 
centre of its curriculum, and Black Mountain was able to attract a distinguished faculty. 
Notable avant-garde faculty members that attended the College included John Cage, Franz 
Kline, Stefan Wolpe, Jackson Pollack, Merce Cunningham, Robert Creeley, and Robert 
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Duncan. Olson ultimately saw Black Mountain as an experiment in living together. He 
described this idea to a BBC audience: 
What really has made it valuable today is that she was not only the first 
breakthrough in curriculum since the middle ages, but she was in some strange way 
right-up-to-date the only, only, communal invention that has substituted for the 
damn Western conception of society. 3 
Interestingly, Olson's personality was so dominant that during his rectorship Black 
Mountain College became identified as an extension of his personality and ideas (Foster 7). 
According to Martin Duberman, author of Black Mountain: An Exploration in Community 
(1973), the seminal text on the college, when Olson became rector there was 
much more emphasis on the literary than the visual arts, and an even more 
disheveled physical plant; a place distinctive, in other words, not in endowment, 
numbers, comfort or public acclaim, but in quality of experience, a frontier society, 
sometimes raucous and raw, isolated and self-conscious, bold in its refusal to 
assume any reality it hadn't tested- and therefore bold in inventing forms, both in 
life style and art, to contain the experiential facts that supplanted tradition's 
agreed-upon definitions. 
(Duberman 336-7) 
In other words, when Olson became rector ofBlack Mountain College, it became an 
extension of his collaboration with Creeley. It became a bigger stage or audience for the 
acceptance and dissemination of his postmodem poetics, projective verse, and the 
philosophy that necessarily followed from it, objectism. Black Mountain College became 
3Charles Olson, quoted in Robert von Hallberg's Charles Olson: The Scholar's Art 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 16-17. This is taken from a transcript of a 
BBC broadcast on Black Mountain College, narrated by Alasdair Clayre. 
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the final stage in the institutionalization of the avant-garde aims of Olson's poetic career. 
The unique place that Charles Olson occupies in American literature is due 
certainly to his position as the first postmodem (Butterick ''Postmodem" 4). Olson 
himself embraced the term, even referring to himself and other like minded poets as 
"[those] of us that want to take on the post-modem" (Human Universe 112). However, it 
must be noted that Olson cannot be merely reduced to being a postmodem poet because to 
do this is to ignore his modem influences, and essentially results in the same kind of 
"either'' "or'' criticism that has far too long dominated Olson scholarship. When Dickey 
and Perloff maintain that Olson is a minor derivation of Pound and Williams they are 
neglecting Olson's postmodem formulation and application ofPound and Williams' 
poetics into his own poetry. Similarly, one cannot simply see Olson in a postmodem light 
because his spatio-temporal positioning in literary history is at the cusp of the epistemic 
break between the modem and the postmodem. As such, Olson should be viewed as 
simultaneously being a part ofboth the modem and the postmodem in the way that he 
carried over elements of the modem into his projective poetics, but it must be remembered 
that his reformulation of these concepts became uniquely postmodem. Olson's healthy 
disrespect of tradition and reliance upon it, his orientation in the avant-garde, and his 
collaboration with Creeley, resulted in a literary figure who cannot be so easily labelled. 
In understanding the significance of Charles Olson's poetics it is necessary to view 
his poetry and prose as two separate halves of a whole entity, in much the same way that 
his collaboration with Creeley has been presented above. Often Olson's prose, with its 
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erratic and idiosyncratic use of grammatical rules, seems more projective than his poetry. 
Indeed, many of the notions he posits in his essays "Projective Verse" and ''Human 
Universe" are not as clearly presented in his poetry. Often the criticisms Olson offers 
against the discursive tradition of poetry and even philosophy are presented in a "half-
baked" manner; he assumes the reader's familiarity with his ideas and so eschews the 
necessary argumentative rigour his sweeping and overly generalized accusations of 
western culture and thought need. This is a common criticism of Olson. 4 
The next chapter in this thesis attempts to provide the details to Olson's argument 
against the foundations of the modern episteme. In order to arrive at this point one must 
begin to understand the "stance toward reality'' that Olson proposes in "Projective Verse" 
and elaborates in ''Human Universe" (Selected Writings 15). Olson's poetry will be seen 
as an elaboration upon notions presented in his prose. This thesis is an attempt to provide 
a clear understanding of Olson's major critique of modern discourse. The next chapter 
presents a detailed analysis of Olson's argument as presented primarily in "Projective 
Verse," Human Universe, and The Special View of History in order to provide his 
argument with the analytical background it has been accused oflacking. The extent of 
Olson's critique will then be seen more clearly. 
4 For example, see James Dickey's section on Olson in his Babel to Byzantium: Poets and 
Poetry Now, Marjorie Perloff' s "Charles Olson and the 'Inferior Predecessors': 
'Projective Verse' Revisited," and Robert von Hallberg's Charles Olson: The Scholar's 
Art. 
42 
Chapterl 
2.1 Introduction 
Although it appears Olson followed random poetic forms that resisted any 
structure, Charles Altieri's assumption that Olson's poetry adheres to a "poetic logic" that 
is quite different from poetry based upon the "discursive logic" of"rational thought" seems 
more likely (Altieri 174). Due to this "poetic logic," Olson's poetry and prose critique the 
logic of the sentence as a complete thought and the notion of a unified, autotelic text. 
Charles Olson's poetry, like other postmodem poetry, includes such things as "dream 
data," "messages," "chance occurrences," "misspellings," "frustrations," ''vulgarity," 
"allusions," "philosophical waxings," and "aesthetic gossip" which act as digressions that 
attempt to free the poem from "anticipated patterns," such as iambic pentameter 
(Butterick, "Postmodem" 20, 22; Golding 77). Interestingly, Olson's projective poetry 
does not always strictly follow the prosodic idealism he posits in his prose. In order to 
grasp the significance of Olson's work, however, it is best to see his poetry and prose as 
two halves of a whole project. Indeed, Olson's prose is filled with idiosyncratic 
grammatical constructions that only make sense if one considers his notion of projectivism 
as advanced in his essay "Projective Verse." The appearance of Olson's open form poetry, 
with its emphasis on the syllable and erratic line breaks, only makes sense when 
understood through the notions he offers in his prose. In order to become familiar with 
Olson's poetic theories and how they become implemented in his prosody, one must begin 
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with an analysis of his most famous prose piece "Projective Verse." 
"Projective Verse" is, in many instances, an idealistic approach to postmodem 
poetry. Olson's prosodic theories are based on notions of the poem as energy-construct, 
and the syllable as the ultimate measure of rhythm. ''Projective Verse" is primarily a 
critique of the logical assertion that the sentence, and by extension, the poetic line, should 
express a complete thought. Olson's critique of the sentence rests primarily on his 
conception of syntax, which abandons the rigor of grammatical logic, emphasizing instead 
what New Critics would see as the "unpoetic" language of the natural speech act (Kellogg 
64). Olson's poetry is an attempt to represent the rhythms of speech, which are more 
dynamic than the rhythms of traditional, iambic based poetry. Olson's poetry and prose 
have also been seen as a "critique" and "disruption" of"Westem metaphysics" (Kellogg 
64; Riddel171). Although Olson does explicitly critique Western metaphysics in "Human 
Universe," the essay is problematic in its overt generalization and simplistic treatment of 
the philosophy of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Olson's critique of post-Socratic 
philosophy will be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter of this thesis, but it is 
enough for now to concentrate more on notions that pertain specifically to prosody and 
Olson's essay ''Projective Verse." 
Olson is no different from other postmodemists in his refusal of preconceived 
forms. The poetic logic of Olson's prosody is more akin to Heraclitus' universe of flux 
than it is to Plato's static and unchanging world of forms (Kellogg 76). Olson's argument 
with preconceived forms is grounded in his denial of the syntax of logical discourse. 
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Further, the meaning of Olson's poetry depends upon his idea that form is only an 
extension of content (Olson, Selected Writings 16), which is more or less the idea that the 
''unified multiplicity" of forces within the poem are more important than the poem's 
references to "interpretive systems" that exist outside of it (Altieri 177, 185). In "Poetry 
and Truth," Olson describes his theory of composition-by-field through images of strain, 
tension, and contortion that represent the discontinuity of his poetry and, as a direct result, 
what he sees as the fallacy of the sentence as a complete thought (Butterick, "Postmodem" 
17; Riddel 171 ). The unique syntax of Olson's poetry and prose cannot be fairly 
understood through conceptions of logically based grammar and traditional rhyme and 
poetic meter. Olson's syntax must be understood though his unique concept of lineation, 
which depends upon the syllable as the measure of his verse. 
This chapter is an attempt to provide a general overview of common characteristics 
of Olson's projective verse. Although the best study of Olson's poetics is arguably Alan 
Golding's "Charles Olson's Metrical Thicket: Toward a Theory ofFree-Verse Prosody," I 
disagree with Golding's assumption that each poem is so individual that Olson's poetry 
cannot be seen to cohere around common prosodic devices. In order to unifY certain 
aspects of Olson's prosodic structure it is necessary to concentrate primarily on his shorter 
poetry. Although The Maximus Poems are considered Olson's magnum opus, it is such a 
huge collection, characterized by what one critic calls the impediment of its "large 
architecture," that it is not fair to Olson's conception of the long poem to deal with these 
poems in isolation (Kellogg 63). Furthermore, there is not sufficient space in this thesis to 
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provide an adequate understanding of the massive collection. There is, however, a large 
body of work written on The Maximus Poems, such as Christensen's Charles Olson: Call 
Him Ishmael, Robert von Hallberg's Charles Olson: The Scholar'sArt, L. S. Dembo's 
"Olson'sMarimus and the Way to Knowledge," Don Byrd's "The Possibility ofMeasure 
in Oison'sMaximus, "and Sherman Paul's Olson's Push: Origin, Black Mountain, and 
Recent American Poetry. In order to demonstrate that Olson's prosody coheres around 
certain unified principles, this chapter deals specifically with lesser known poems in the 
canon of Olson's shorter poetry. 
2.2 Projective Vene 
In 1950, at the age of forty, Charles Olson's first major statement of his views on 
poetry and the philosophical elements that ground this "new" poetics was published in 
October in Poetry New York. He called this essay ''Projective Verse." This piece 
combines much of his vast knowledge into a uniquely poetical-philosophical position and is 
arguably Olson's most widely known and academically accepted text. "Projective Verse" 
is his most anthologized work, now an integral part of the postmodem American literary 
canon, appearing in Donald Allen and George F. Butterick's influential collection The 
Postmodems: The New American Poetry, Allen and Warren Tallman's The Poetics of the 
New American Poetry, and Paul Hoover's Postmodem American Poetry: A Norton 
Anthology. The nine-page essay is demarcated into two major sections. The first details a 
new technical approach to modem prosody and the last attempts to explain this new 
46 
poetics through a unique philosophical ground based on "composition by field": 
The objects which occur at every given moment of composition (of recognition, we 
can call it) are, can be, must be treated exactly as they do occur therein and not by 
any ideas or preconceptions from outside the poem, must be handled as a series of 
objects in field in such a way that a series of tensions (which they also are) are 
made to hold, and to hold exactly inside the content and the context of the poem 
which has forced itself: through the poet and them, into being. 
(Olson Selected Writings 20) 
Olson's notion of field composition characterizes the unique relationship between 
the construction of projective poetry and the philosophical position (objectism) that occurs 
from and gives semantic form to projective verse. Creating poetry based upon Olson's 
polemical conception of a "field" of tensions interacting with one another within the 
content and form of the poem, as well as the creative faculties of the poet himself: has been 
said to resemble the non-Euclidean conception of an energy field (Christensen 57). Olson 
saw the individual artist as a field of perception, constantly mediating intrusions from the 
phenomena of the larger world outside of the individual mind. Within Olson's view of a 
person's relationship with reality it was impossible for any one part of the larger 
phenomenal field to be understood or experienced as clearly and authentically as the 
individual field or mind. 
Olson's argument here raises the classic question concerning the nature of 
subjectivity and objectivity, albeit redressed in the specialized language of postmodem 
scientific theories about geometric space, mathematics, and physics. The problem Olson is 
confronted with is whether we can only truly trust our own subjective state of mind, and if 
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this is the case, as it is for Olson, how do we account for our massive and daily intefaction 
with the larger world? How do we process our experiences with it? Olson sees his 
methodology of ''Projective Verse" as a necessary act that the artist, particularly the poet, 
must adhere to in order for the emphasis on formulaic constructions of poetcy, such as 
metered and rhymed poetcy, to be weakened. Olson believed that the discrepancies he 
found between subject and object could be overcome through coherence around a 
common principle. The logical choice for a common principle became his own principle of 
prosody: projective verse. However, his poetic and philosophical theories are based upon 
various notions taken from several disciplines of modem scholarship: from literature, 
history, and philosophy, to music, the visual arts, and science. 
Although Olson had familiarized himself with the philosophical theories governing 
the new rules of non-Euclidean geometcy while studying under Hans Rademacher during 
his tenure at Black Mountain College, he characteristically took only what he felt was 
necessary to his own scholarship (Christensen 57). Olson's own reformulation of non-
Euclidean mathematical concepts resulted in his subsequent oversimplification of the 
complex and often rigid philosophical investigation that grounds mathematical inquiry. 
The result is that Olson's views about and usage of non-Euclidean geometric theories of 
space are highly questionable from the serious scholar's viewpoint. But Olson's 
appropriation of scientific fact, however inaccurate, is quite interesting in terms of how he 
fashioned his own conception of (post)modem American verse. The most immediate and 
clear example of Olson's use of non-Euclidean theories of spatiality is seen in how he 
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anarchically places stanzas and poetic clusters all over the page. Olson no longer sees 
space as two-dimensional like it is in Cartesian and Euclidean geometry. Rather, like the 
non-Euclidean geometers, he is attempting a three-dimensional framework for his poetic 
reformulation of space. This is most obvious in the typography of Olson's poems: the left 
hand margin is no longer a rigid imaginary line against which to base the positioning of his 
poetry. In the 1954 poem "Love" one can see Olson's attempt to incorporate space into 
the presentation and meaning of his poem, as well as a rare use of enclosed parentheses, 
which he often avoids, usually favoring instead the open ended parenthesis: 
There is no intelligence 
the equal of 
the situation 
There are only 
Two ways: 
Create the situation 
(And this love) 
Or avoid it. 
This also can be 
Love. 
(Collected Poems 300) 
In "The Motion" Olson places the priority of prosodic spacing on an equal level of 
importance as the words themselves. This technique is so pervasive that the reader is 
forced to recognize the significant role that space plays in Olson's projective poetry: 
the motion 
not verbal 
the newt 
less active 
not my nature 
I. .. 
than I: the fire pink 
not me 
(the words 
not me 
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(Collected Poems 300) 
Olson's poetry is often formed around a unique conception of prosodic spatial orientation. 
However, much like the lack of rigor Olson often exemplifies in his appropriation of 
other's ideas (like his reformulation of non-Euclidean geometry), he does not strictly 
adhere to his own unconventional notions of spacing prosody. In fact, his poems can also 
appear quite conventional in their positional conformity toward the left-hand margin. For 
example, in "The Thing was Moving," a poem Olson sent to Robert Creeley in May, 1952, 
there is a strict formal adherence to the left-hand margin, but Olson's grammar (or lack 
thereof) within the stanzas is still unconventional: 
It's so beautiful, life, goddamn death 
that we have to die, only the mind knows what lies next the heart or a five-petaled flower 
restores the fringed gentians I used to so love 
I'd lie amongst them in the meadow near the house 
which was later covered by a dump to make an athletic field 
and the brook was gone to which we tried to speed our sleds 
from the hill the house stood on and which the dump 
was meant to join, the loss punctuated by the shooting ... 
(Collected Poems 263) 
It appears as though the poem was never properly edited for grammatical mistakes, but 
this is also part of Olson's attempt to break free from the grip that "rules" have had upon 
modem American poetry. Much the same can be said of Olson's prose, which becomes 
more projective as his career evolves. Indeed Olson's Proprioception (1962) and The 
Vinland Map Review (1965) appear more like rough journal entries than essays, and 
because of their chaotic typography they appear to be formulations of Olson's projective 
theories of verse applied to prose: 
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(Collected Prose 192) 
Olson's study of non-Euclidean geometty led him to the conclusion that the totality 
of our experience, both the subjective inner world of the individual mind and the objective 
and less personalized field of the phenomenal world outside of ourselves, could be 
understood through his unifYing principle of objectism that allowed, in his opinion, these 
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two seemingly distinct realms of experience to cohere. In Olson's mind, his reformulation 
of non-Euclidean geometry shared a similar intellectual theme to one he claimed to have 
first noticed in his own readings ofMelville: the desire to move away from what he saw as 
the limitations of previously established thought-structures. 
Non-Euclidean geometry, Melville, and the analytical philosopher Alfred North 
Whitehead were all assimilated into Olson's own work with little reliance upon any logical 
formulation of his own argument. Instead of philosophical rigor and objectiveness, Olson 
offered random assertions based upon his very personal and passionate understanding of 
concepts he felt were important catalysts in overcoming the "old system" of thought that 
dominated ideas about poetry, philosophy, and hi.story. Olson's anti-logical fastening of 
disparate areas of thought became the basis for his philosophy of experience that he felt 
necessarily followed from projective poetry. Altieri refers to this anti-logic as "poetic 
logic," which was consequently not dependent upon meaning, or the "discursive logic of 
rational thought" (174). The argument Olson proposed was that in order to write 
projectively one must think projectively as well. Olson named this philosophical stance 
"objectism," but this philosophy is not completely objective. 
In formulating this phenomenological stance Olson also borrowed from the British 
analytical philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead, the notions that subject and object are 
equal and matter is more dynamic than Aristotle's matter as substance (von Hallberg, 
"Olson, Whitehead, and the Objectivists" 90, 93). These notions became Olson's own 
philosophical basis for what he felt was happening within a poem. Olson's hypothesis, 
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however, lacked the rigid analytic form of Whitehead's, and therefore was more in the 
tradition of an existentialist, or the phenomenology ofHeidegger, than an analytical 
philosopher. Indeed, Olson misconstrued Whitehead's theory of objectification as 
abstraction and formulated an anthrocentric concept of an alternative humanism from 
Whitehead, even though Whitehead himself did not see humanity as a more important 
entity than any other in his philosophy (Whitehead, Process and Reality 140; Olson, 
Selected Writings 103; von Hallberg, "Olson, Whitehead, and the Objectivists" 103). 
Olson's philosophical posturing relied more on personal feeling than on analytical logic 
and, therefore, is better situated within the tradition of Rousseau and Emerson, not that of 
Aristotle or Kant. 
2.3 A Discontinuous Multiplicity 
Although upon first glance Olson's poetry may appear to be randomly created, 
there is a definite structural formula and philosophy to the new form of poetry he and 
other projective poets such as Robert Duncan and Robert Creeley were positing in post-
war America, and this "structure" will become more apparent as we move through major 
collections of his poetry and prose: The Collected Poems of Charles Olson: Excluding the 
Maximus Poems (1987), Human Universe (1967), Muthologos (1979), and The Special 
View of History (1970). At this point it is important to understand the meaning behind 
Olson's ideas of open versification because his poems are quite different :from other strains 
of American poetry. Olson's projective verse can be characterized by his idiosyncratic 
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usage of grammatical rules governing punctuation such as the comma, and his insistence 
on a unique physical appearance for the poems themselves, with line breaks occurring at 
unexpected points and stanzas that often defy the left-hand margin of the page. As such, 
Olson's poetry is difficult for the uninitiated to understand. It is even hard to read the 
poems properly without an in-depth look at the principles guiding his distinctive verse, but 
one must realize that Olson does not adhere to his own theories as strictly as one might 
suppose. 
Much of Olson's prosody hinges upon his acceptance ofFenellosa's notion of the 
sentence as a transference of power, and his subsequent criticism of the sentence as a 
grammatical construction that forms a complete thought. Riddel refers to Olson's 
disruption of the traditional sentence as "discontinuous play of forces" because "nothing 
returns to a subject" in his poetry (171 ). It is not that the content does not return to its 
subject, as Riddel suggests, but rather that Olson is trying to remove the conception of the 
subject within his poetry so that there is only a multiplicity of objects interacting with one 
another. One can see Olson's attempt at removing the dominance of the subject in "From 
the Inca," a two-line poem from 1952: "The mighty man and the mother-egg I leg over leg 
over leg" (Collected Poems 215). But Riddel is correct in suggesting that Olson's poetry 
is more oriented around "chance" and "accident" than it is around the subject, as Olson 
himself phrases this as ''the chance success of a play of creative accidents" in The Special 
View of History (Riddel 179; Olson 49). The extent to which Olson is successful in 
eliminating the predominance of the subject, however, is debatable; he has been accused of 
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being as much of an idealist in his language and poetics as Plato was in his philosophy 
(Kellogg 75). 
The first and most significant explication of his poetic project is defined by the four 
principles described in his 1950 essay "Projective Verse." The first principle concerns the 
kinetics of the poem, where the concept of the poem becomes an energy-construct: "a 
poem is energy transferred from where the poet got it," because Olson feels that "the 
poem itself must, at all points, be a high energy-construct and, at all points, an energy 
discharge" (Selected Writings 16). This results in what Butterick has called an "intensified 
syntax" which is brought about by Olson's "systemic disordering" of the poetic line 
("Postmodem" 5). The most immediate example of this can be seen in the rapid-fire, 
stream-of-consciousness-styled semantics of Olson's poetry as it appears on the page of 
the text itself: 
is the face 
Direction-a directed magnitude-is 
resurrection 
All that has been 
suddenly is: time 
of recognition, Rhoda Straw; or my son 
is a Magyar ... 
("A Newly Discovered 'Homeric' Hymn," Collected Poems 66-1). 
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The word 'is' appears four times in the above cluster, adding to the urgency of the poem 
through the "syntactic strain" of its repetition, which forces the reader to enter Olson's 
idiosyncratic "world oflanguage" (Butterick, "Postmodern'' 18). Furthermore, the 
reformulation or inversion of the noun 'direction' to the adjective 'directed,' in 
"Direction--a directed magnitude ... "; revolves around the root word or verb 'direct.' 
Words are repeated and roots of words are altered with different suffixes and prefixes, 
confirming that Olson is more concerned with the etymology of language than with 
conveying a dramatic image (Altieri 183). For example, in the opening stanza of the poem 
"In Cold Hell, In Thicket," written in 1950, there is a heavy repetition of the word how: 
In cold hell, in thicket, how 
abstract (as high mind, as not lust, as love is) how 
strong (as strut or wing, as polytope, as things are 
constellated) how strung, how cold 
can a man stay (can men) confronted 
thus? 
(Collected Poems 155, italics added for emphasis) 
There is also an almost obsessive insertion of the comma into the lines of poetry, a jarring 
use of bracketed thought clusters ("as strut or wing, as polytope, as things are I 
constellated"), as well as unconventional breaks in the length of Olson's line, with "can a 
man stay (can men) confronted I thus?" Olson characteristically breaks the poetic line 
prematurely in order to "decenter" the narrative line (Riddel180). In order to best 
understand the connotations ofRiddel's interpretation of Olson's projective project it is 
helpful to interpret Riddel's notion of decentering in terms ofBakhtin's centrifugal 
( disunifying/decentering) and centripetal (unifying/centering) forces in The Dialogic 
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Imagination. Although Bakhtin was primarily concerned with the noveL Olson's poetic 
line can be seen as a centrifugal force that decenters the homogenizing centripetal forces of 
the narrative line. Furthermore, Olson's poetry is not dominated by one voice or subject; 
it is more of a multiplicity of centrifugal objects. For example, in the poem "Friday, Good 
Friday ... ",the presence of several different voices competing in conversation acts as a 
centrifugal force, decentering the centripetal, UllifYing voice of the poet: 
... WelL some years ago, one Good Friday, 
we were all down to the gas station, sitting around chewing the fat, 
when Walter says, "What about a little game, boys." Sez the others, 
"Why, Walter! Don't you know? This is Good Friday!" 
And Walter, who always sort of drawled after he grew up, answers, 
"Whhhat's goooood aboooout it? Allll Iiii can 
sssay isss, Iiiiii hoooope it'll be Gooooood 
for meeeee!" 
(Collected Poems 145) 
Projective poetry is therefore a poetic reformulation ofBakhtin's disunifying notion of 
heteroglossia. This is what Riddel is trying to say when he refers to the "decentering" 
element of Olson's line. 
According to Olson's projectivist stance, repetitions, comma splices, and 
parentheses allow the poem to retain the "energy'' or immediacy of the thoughts as they 
appeared in Olson's mind to the moment when the reader reactivates this kinetic 
phenomenon: 
A poem is energy transferred from where the poet got it (he will have some several 
causations), by way of the poem itself to, all the way over to, the reader. . .. Then 
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the poem itself must, at all points, be a high energy-construct and, at all points, an 
energy discharge . . .. [ A]n energy which is peculiar to verse alone and which will 
be ... different from the energy which the reader ... will take away. 
(Selected Writings 16) 
According to this statement, for Olson there is no depreciation or distance between 
the projective poem as the medium for the reader's internalization of the projective poem's 
message and the reader's experience of the projective poem as such. Olson allows for 
differences in the experience between a projective poet as creator and the reader of this 
poem as receiver, but for him there must never be a weakening of the poem's energy from 
the moment of creation to the instant of reception, and this is an important element of 
Olson's projectivism. This means that the speed and immediacy of Olson's thoughts as 
rapidly spinning out oflogically based order are to be instantaneously realized as a 
kinetically charged experience. The reader should see the speed and immediacy of Olson's 
verse from inspiration to completion because the poem's urgency is manifested on the 
page itself with his odd usage of the comma, parentheses, abrupt line breaks, and irregular 
positioning of stanzas. Olson's projective verse shows that the struggle to create the poem 
is still alive, imprinted upon the page. 
The visual retention of the creative struggle involved in composing poetry 
characterized by the apparently "rough" or unfinished appearance of Olson's verse is 
important to Olson's poetics because it shows a less ego-driven presence within the poem; 
it is also a physical representation of Olson's composition-by-field philosophy. Indeed, 
during a lecture he gave at Black Mountain College in 1956, Olson described the poem as 
a struggle between variance, dissension, contention and dissonance (Charters 88). Even in 
one of Olson's earliest attempts at projective verse, "La Preface," one can see images of 
"strain" and "contortion" that characterize his notion of field composition (Butterick, 
"Postmodem" 20). 
Birth in the house is the One of Sticks, cunnus in the crotch. 
Draw it thus: ( ) 1910 ( 
It is not obscure. We are the new born, and there are no flowers. 
Document means there are no flowers 
and no parenthesis. 
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(Collected Poems 41) 
There are overt sexual images, parentheses, both closed and open, with nothing written 
inside them, the date of Olson's birth (1910), and an apocalyptic commentary on what his 
generation has been born into ('We are the new born, and there are no flowers"). ''La 
Preface" retains a sense of Olson's creative struggle in constructing the poem, and the 
poem is, therefore, disunified and ''unfinished" in its typography. 
2.4 Typography 
The visual appearance of Charles Olson's poetry has obviously become a major 
factor in appreciating his verse. In the essay "Olson's Metrical Thicket: Toward a Theory 
of Free Verse Prosody," Alan Golding states that "typography becomes a major clue to 
rhythmic structure" ( 66). Golding bases his theory of Olson's free verse prosody on the 
rhythm and intonation breaks that create Olson's line. Because of Olson's reliance upon 
the syllable instead of the narrative line, Golding correctly sees the syllable as the only 
"objectively measureable entity" in Olson's verse (66). Because Olson adheres to the 
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rhythms of speech, in order to analyze the nature of Olson's line, poetic rhythm is best 
measured by the beats of the syllable. 
Using Olson's poem "In Cold Hell, in Thicket" as an example, Golding defines the 
"appositional rhythm" of Olson's poem as an "intensification of stress" that is brought into 
coherence by the juxtaposition of"sharp line-breaks," "polysyllables," "a predominance of 
monosyllables," and by the regular occurrence of"caesura," and "enjambment" (68-9,72-
3). Like other critics of Olson's prosody, such as Ralph Maud's What Does Not Change: 
The Significance of Charles Olson's "The Kingfishers" (1998), and to a lesser extent 
Robert von Hallberg's Charles Olson: The Scholar's Art (1978), Golding relies heavily 
upon the poems "In Cold Hell, In Thicket" and "The Kingfishers" to explain his theory of 
Olson's prosody. The reason for their reliance upon these poems is that they are some of 
the most obvious examples of Olson's projective verse, and so have become part of the 
Olson canon. However, much of what Golding says about Olson's prosody can be applied 
to his other lesser known poems, albeit in a slightly different context. The 1951 poem, 
"Abstract #1, Yucatan," also displays abrupt line-breaks, a predominant use of 
monosyllables, and caesurae which occur more often towards the end of his poetic line 
rather than its traditional appearance in the middle of the line. The pause, or caesura, is 
often indicated by Olson's forced insertion of the comma, which would often be seen as a 
comma splice by grammarians. The poem is included in its entirety here so that Olson's 
prosodic structure will appear appropriately in context. 
the fish is speech, or see 
what, cut 
in stone, starts, for 
when the sea breaks, watch 
watch: it is the tongue, and 
he who introduces the words (the 
interlocutor) the 
beginner of the word, he 
you will find, he 
has scales, he 
gives off motion as 
in the sun the wind the light, a fish 
moves 
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(Collected Poems 203) 
In the second stanza there is a repetition of "watch" but this repetition is 
interrupted by the break in the line. In the next two stanzas there is the repetition of"he," 
which creates syntactical accumulation, or in Butterick' s words "syntactical strain" 
("Postmodem" 18). However, the dominant technique in this poem, as with most others 
by Olson, is the jarring use of the comma as caesurae. All these devices create a sense of 
tension or "struggle" within the poem, and Olson uses them intentionally to add intensity 
and speed to the poem through an abandonment of grammatically correct syntax. 
Although there are few consistent structures to base a theory of Olson's prosody 
upon, mainly because postmodem poetry does not particularly adhere to preconceived 
forms, Olson's use of the comma as caesurae and his etymological emphasis on syntactical 
significance demonstrate his projective verse, and as Creeley suggests, emphasize the 
prosody of poetry and not its interpretation (Butterick, "Postmodem" 21; Creeley, A 
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Quick Graph 163). Similarly, in Proprioception, Olson describes his approach to writing 
as "[ w ]ord writing. Instead of 'idea-writing' (ideogram etc.). That would seem to be it" 
(3). Indeed, Pound's idea that "[p]rosody is the articulation of the total sound of the 
poem'' can also be said to be shared by Olson (Creeley, A Quick Graph 163). Olson is 
more concerned with the overall sound of his poetry than he is with its meaning, and this 
further explains Riddel' s assertion that Olson's poetry rarely returns to its subject because 
there is no need to return to the subject if the poetry is oriented toward sound and not 
meaning (Riddel171, 175). It is, however, difficult to discuss Olson without recourse to 
the poetic symbol as subject. 
The difference between a New Critical poet who emphasizes the poetic symbol as 
subject, what Olson calls symbology, and a poet emphasizing projectivism, is similar to 
those who "make use of traditional forms" for "discipline or solution," and those who, as 
Olson does, go "by ear'' (Creeley, A Quick Graph 163). The difference between a New 
Critical poet and a projective poet like Olson is also the difference between poetry that 
seeks only to describe where Olson wishes to enact (Gray 281). This working "by ear," in 
Creeley's words, or by speech rhythms in Olson's words, contributes to Olson's unique 
typography or prosody. Therefore, in comparison with other pre-modem and modem 
poetry that is dominated by symbology, Olson's poetry will seem not to make "sense" 
from this stance. 
The disparity between Olson's unique typography and that of a more traditional 
prosodic structure where rhyme and meter predominate can be more clearly seen if we 
look at the opening verse of a George Herbert poem from 1633 - a poem which, from 
Olson's projectivist stance, exemplifies a much less immediate transference of energy:5 
The merry world did on a day 
With his train-bands and mates agree 
To meet together where I lay, 
And all in sport to jeer at me. 
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("The Quip," George Herbert: The Complete English Poems 1 02). 
"The Quip," in visual form (the familiar quatrain), pre-modem diction ("The merry world 
did on a day''), traditionally established rhyme-scheme ( abab ), and the rhythm of iambic 
pentameter, creates, from Olson's view, more distance between the poet, the poem, and 
the modem reader of this poetry than projective verse. Simply put, for Olson the more 
"closed" a poem is to a projective stance the less kinetic it is. Olson's first principle of 
''Projective Verse," that "the poem itself must, at all points, be a high energy-construct 
and, at all points, an energy discharge," is intended to keep the poem more active and 
activating for the reader (Selected Writings 16). Therefore, this principle is in direct 
opposition to a deadening or dulling of language that occurs in poetry constructed from 
adhering to prescribed forms (such as iambic pentameter and rhyming couplets), 
established in most cases by a poetic formula that predates the twentieth century: "form 
5But it is interesting to note that Herbert's "Easter Wings"(1633), among other selections 
from The Temple, may be seen as quite "projective" for the seventeenth-century. Of 
particular note for the "projective" poet is how in "Easter Wmgs" the stanzas appear 
visually as ''wings," or concrete poetry. However, not all poems from this collection are 
what Olson would refer to as projective, and even ''Easter Wmgs" is not entirely 
projective in the contemporary sense because ofits inherited (apriori) rhyme scheme. 
got set by Sappho & Homer," Olson says, "and [form] hasn't changed much since" 
(Selected Writings 28). 
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Olson's idea for kinetic poetry depends upon the poet's openness to the energy 
forces of perception and language that are around him. The result, according to Olson's 
intellectual counterpart Robert Creeley, is that the poem is "some thing, a structure 
possessed of its own organization in tum derived from the circumstances of its making" 
(Creeley, A Quick Graph 186). Writing projective-ly then is a direct progression of 
perception, resulting in the knowledge that echoes the words of Edward Sapir, a linguist 
Olson quotes extensively in Proprioception: "style is not an absolute, a something that is 
to be imposed on the language from Greek or Latin models, but merely the language itseU: 
running in its natural grooves" (Sapir, Language 242). 
2.5 A Geneaology of Influence 
The notion of the poem as an "energy-construct" was not entirely of Olson's own 
origination. In The Poetry of Charles Olson: A Primer (1982), Thomas F. Merrill 
documents that the idea came to Olson from his reading ofFenollosa, particularly 
Fenellosa's concept of the "sentence as a 'transferrence of power' applied to verse"; and 
from Ezra Pound, who, along with Williams years earlier, had developed the notion of the 
poem as a kinetic entity ( 49). Indeed, William Carlos Williams' essay "The Poem as a 
Field of Action," published in 1948, demanded a new view of poetry that is reminiscent of 
Olson's dabbling in non-Euclidean geometry and Einsteinian theories of relativity. 
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According to Williams, "[t]he one thing that the poet has not wanted to change ... is 
structure" (283) and an attack on structure "must be concentrated on the rigidity of the 
poetic foot' (289). Therefore, he proposed: "sweeping changes from top to bottom of the 
poetic structure .... I say we are through with iambic pentameter ... through with the 
measured quatrain, the staid concatenations of sounds in the usual stanza, the sonnet .... 
[b]ecause [the sonnet] is a form which does not admit of the slightest structural change in 
its composition"(281, 291). In ''Projective Verse" Olson mirrors Williams' position when 
he says "[i]t would do no harm ... ifboth rime and meter ... sense and sound were less in 
the forefront of the mind than the syllable"; and, if this were to occur, the projective poet 
would be speaking language that is "least careless," but also "least logical," or anti-logical 
in Riddel's view (Olson, Selected Writings 18; Riddell63). 
In his seminal essay, Williams also demands a new observation of speech as it 
presently exists in order to "discover'' or bring about the changes in poetic structure 
necessary to reinvigorate poetic language particularly, and language in general (290). In 
an analogy referring to "dead classics" that "we have never heard as living speech," 
Williams asserts that likewise "[n]o one has or can·hear them as they were written any 
more than we can hear Greek today (290). Olson expresses a similar notion oflanguage 
in "La Preface" where the dead are in the way (The dead in via I in vita nuova I in the 
way), obstructing the creation of new forms of thought in space and poetry (Olson, 
Collected Poems 46-1; Kellogg 69). A similar theme can be found in "As the Dead Prey 
Upon Us," but here the dead are as much a part of the living as they are of death: 
As the dead prey upon us, 
they are the dead in ourselves, 
awake, my sleeping ones, I cry out to you, 
disentangle the nets of being! ... 
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(Collected Poems 388) 
Olson also declares his similarity with Williams in his essay ''Human Universe" where he 
says that speech is in "need of restoration" (Selected Writings 54). In "Human Universe" 
Olson is attempting to reverse the influence that the "dead classics" (Williams 290) have 
had upon our conception of the speech act. The obvious affinities between Olson's ideas 
in "Projective Verse," which appears only two years after Williams' "The Poem as a Field 
of Action,"and his essay "Human Universe," published three years after Williams' essay 
and Olson's poetry, are quite startling. Both demand a new poetics that reflects the 
modem condition more so than traditional forms and the then status quo ofNew Critical 
poetics. Both also see this new poetic direction as being grounded within the way 
language is presently heard and used. This is why Olson and Williams attacked antiquated 
notions of poetic measurements, like the conception of the poetic foot, that contnbute to 
the idea that the poem's content should be dominated by its form. 
The separation between Olson and Creeley' s thought here also seems to be not 
easily demarcated. Many of the ideas found in ''Projective Verse" also appear in Charles 
Olson and Robert Creeley: The Complete Co"espondence (1980), often predating the 
publication of''Projective Verse," albeit not in a fully synthesized manner. However, it is 
enough to note here that much of what becomes "Projective Verse" is an aggregate of 
(post)modem American poetic theories, such as those ofPound and Williams, the latter 
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whom later "borrowed" much of Olson's seminal essay in his own Autobiography (1951t, 
and others with whom he corresponded, such as Creeley, Edward Dahlberg, and Ezra 
Pound. 
A coherency behind "Projective Verse" can be seen in Olson's explicit desire for a 
new, modem poetics, quite obviously against the inherited a priori traditions of New 
Critical poetry- what Olson termed the ''NON-Projective"-- or "closed verse" (Selected 
Writings 15). To further clarify the distinction between projective verse and closed verse, 
Olson offers the second axiom of his poetics: ''FORM IS NEVER MORE THAN AN 
EXTENSION OF CONTENT" (Selected Writings 16). The phrasing of this second 
doctrine is officially attributed to Robert Creeley. 7 This statement is the most famous 
phrase in "Projective Verse," an "overstated" and metaphysically oriented romantic 
conception that is offered as Olson's refutation ofNew Critical formalism (Kuberski 181). 
This notion depends greatly upon the next proposition in the essay "ONE PERCEPTION 
MUST IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY LEAD TO A FURTHER PERCEPTION'' 
(Selected Writings 17). The result, according to Altieri, is that the form of Olson's poetry 
is dependent upon the action of events, not discourse (176). Subsuming the importance of 
form under content is Olson's attempt to reverse the idea that form comes before ideas, 
which, consequently, stems directly from the Greek conception of the sentence as a 
Williams included ''Projective Verse" in the introduction to his autobiography without any 
mention of: or permission from, Charles Olson. 
7"(0r so it phrased by one, R. Creeley, and it makes perfect sense to me ... )"in Selected 
Writings 16. 
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"completed thought" (Human Universe 95). Furthermore, Creeley's claim 
epistemologically implies that the object of the poem is more complete than what is usually 
thought (von Hallberg 114). Poetic content exists as its own form. This form is present in 
the content of the poem even before a poet imposes his own formal conceptions upon it. 
The process of extending content into form is the task that the projective poet must 
pursue. Translating form into content is the activity as discovery, according to Creeley. 
In a 1978 interview with William Spanos, Creeley offers the best description of 
content becoming form. Here he likens the process to emptying a glass of water on the 
:floor: " ... take a glass of water and just dump it on the :floor. The fact of water- the 
content inherently of water - discovers a form - a form specific to its "nature," to put it 
loosely - on the surface it meets. No idea of water will change that situation ... " 
(Spanos, "Talking" 22). Similarly, in the posthumously releasedMuthologos (1978), 
Olson says "[y]ou enter the subject matter, and that projection is where you permit your 
feeling to :flow and go out through the subject matter'' (Muthologos 1: 184). The key idea 
to glean from this second precept is that content acts as the nucleus for the formal 
appearance and sound of the poem. This then supposedly results in a simultaneity of form 
and content at the moment(s) of creation and reception. However, if form precedes 
content, and therefore dictates content, then the type of poetic experience for both poet 
and reader is less immediate, less free, and less natural than its projective counterpart. 
This idea, perhaps communicated more precisely in Olson's correspondences with Robert 
Creeley, is that "[t]he 'formal' has killed what the head: might get into: in that it has put 
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menial/ enclosed/ work: what it sd have been determining, ONLY as an extension of its 
center: in any given work. Which is to say: as now, in many, the insistence on an attention 
(FIRST) to possible castings for a content" (Oison-Creeley Co"espondence, 1:63). Both 
Creeley and Olson are opposed to any formal control of the poem because in their view it 
gives rise to a static work, whereas a free-flowing, keen attentiveness to acting as an ego-
less, non-controlling agency manifests itself as an open, projective work. Although the 
concept is hard to accept as a poetic principle because ofits almost naive idealism, it is 
best to understand it as a rejection ofNew Critical formalism. 
The third principle of"Projective Verse" derives directly from Olson's redefinition 
of the relationship of content and form which defines the "process, of the poem as a 
progression that moves rapidly between a multiplicity of perceptions. Olson phrases it as: 
"ONE PERCEPTION MUST MOVE IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY LEAD TO A 
FURTHER PERCEPTION'' (Selected Writings 17). This statement, along with his 
emphasis on the poem as kinetic entity, explains Olson's "high tolerance for disorder'' in 
his poetry (Butterick, "Postmodem" 22). The interrelationship of these two poetic ideals 
becomes apparent when Olson says "keep moving, keep in, speed, the nerves, their speed, 
their perceptions, theirs, the acts, the split second acts, the whole business, keep it moving 
as fast as you can citizen ... always, always, one perception must must must MOVE, 
INSTANTER, ON ANOTHER!" (Selected Writings 17). He gives Edward Dahlberg, 8 
B£dward Dahlberg has authored Bottom Dogs, Those Who Perish, The Flea of Sodom, as 
well as other works. Most interesting to Olson scholars, however, is his influence on 
Olson's own Call Me Ishmael (1947)- a book on Herman Melville andMoby Dick. 
mentor, author, and rector of Black Mountain College before Olson took over as rector 
from 1951-6, credit for this idea: "I think it can be boiled down into one statement (first 
pounded into my head by Edward Dahlberg) .. . "(Selected Writings 17). 
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Olson acknowledges Dahlberg as the source for this dogma and John Cech 
suggests that Dahlberg is responsible for the initial phrasing and poetic practice that 
became perfected by Olson in "Projective Verse." In his book Charles Olson and Edward 
Dahlberg: A Portrait of a Friendship (1982), Cech says "Dahlberg had been instrumental 
in helping Olson to define the process by which the projective poet should work" (111 ). 
Indeed, during the winter of 1945, in a unpublished manuscript, Olson declares his 
insistence on the racing immediacy of perceptual progression: ''Leap ahead and try the 
ambitions. Go to the extreme of your imagination and go on from there: fail large, never 
succeed small. Again ED [Dahlberg] makes sense: one intuition must only lead to another 
farther place"( qtd. in Cech, 88-9; from an unpublished manuscript note in Olson Archive at 
the University of Connecticut). This gives Olson's poems a "dizzying quality" 
(Christensen 72) that move through a helter-skelter montage of rapidly juxtaposed images. 
This "process" gives Olson's poems their speed, their cascading abstractions, their force, 
and their unhindered intellectual toponymy; but this principle is yet another idealism that 
finds its way into Olson's postmodem poetry (Kuberski 181). 
2.6 Reading the Poem "Projectively" 
Now if we return to "A Newly Discovered 'Homeric' Hymn"we can see all the 
principles of"Projective Verse" in operation: 
is the face 
Direction-a directed magnitude-is 
resurrection 
All that has been 
suddenly is: time 
of recognition, Rhoda Straw; or my son 
is a Magyar. The luminousness 
of my daughter 
to her mother 
by a stream: 
apocatastasis ... 
(Selected Poems 66-7) 
The progression of perception in Olson's poems can be seen in the way the syllables of 
each phrase are juxtaposed with one another. Olson relies upon the syllable as the 
rhythmic measure of his poetry because it allows the poems to be more dynamic than if 
they were written according to the rhythm of the metrical foot. Olson's emphasis on the 
syllable is also an attempt to base the rhythm of his poetry upon the natural rhythms of 
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breath and speech (Riddel180). Altieri correctly sees Olson's argument for breath as a 
part of the "rhythmic measure" of his poetry as a "questionable" attempt to replace New 
Critical or formalist conceptions of poetic rhythm (178). As such, it is best to see Olson's 
breath argument as an idealistic extension of his notion of the syllable as guiding rhythmic 
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measure for the poem. Furthermore, a syllable can be seen in terms of basic rhythmic 
patterns - "be" and "being" for example, have one and two syllables, or beats, 
respectively. With the syllable acting as guiding agent in the poem's rhythm we no longer 
need any knowledge of metrical feet and rhythmic variation inherited from Greek, Latin, 
and European models. The projective poet can now create lines that break in accordance 
with the rhythm of respiration and the natural rhythms inherent in the words themselves. 
In the first phrase of"A Newly Discovered 'Homeric' Hymn" the word "Direction" 
has three beats or syllables, and it is separated by a dash, which acts like a rest in musical 
notation, "[t]or the fist time the poet has the stave and bar a musician has had" (Selected 
Writings 22); this is then followed by the seven beats of"a directed magnitude,"which is 
again followed by a dash or rest, with the line finally ending with "is," which contains one 
beat. Thus, there is an initial build up of pace, moving from three beats to seven. The 
section's contrapuntality occurs, however, when "is" the single-beat word, is left dangling 
at the end of the line, slowing the pace of the poem's progression, creating a dizzying 
movement in the first line. However, the pause also acts as a kind of"half-rest," to 
borrow another term from music, before beginning the next line with "resurrection." It is 
also a further example of what Riddel describes as Olson's "decentering of the poetic line," 
and it is brought about by Olson's emphasis on poetic logic rather than discursive logic 
(Riddel 180; Altieri 174). 
The word "resurrection" contains four syllables or beats, and it is the only word 
that comprises the second line of the excerpt. It also acts as a kind of temporary time-
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signature for the next rhythmic cluster of four beats that can be seen and heard in "All that 
has been f'and "suddenly is." The stability of the line's rhythm is slightly jarred with the 
interjection of"is" at the end of the fourth line. This allows the reader to take the poem's 
cue that the word following "is" must be read and understood at a slower, pause-for-
thought pace, and this important word is, ultimately, ''time." 
is the face 
All that has been 
suddenly is: time 
of recognition, Rhoda Straw; or my son ... 
(Collected Poems 66-61) 
"Time" is "All that has been" and both "Time" and "All that has been" are ''the 
face/of recognition, Rhoda Straw; or my son ... ,"due to the repetition of"is." This 
excerpt of "A Newly Discovered 'Homeric' Hymn" shows the kinetics of the poem as an 
energy construct containing various spiraling rhythms which depend upon Olson's 
compounding a multiplicity of images and perceptions within short abruptive lines. The 
visual appearance of the poem and its grammatical, as well as rhythmic, structure are 
characteristic of Olson's non-linear syntax. 
"Projective Verse" is arguably the most important essay ever written by Charles 
Olson. However, George F. Butterick believes that Olson's essay ''Human Universe" is 
the most important work in Olson's canon. In that essay Olson articulates his criticism of 
logical discourse that is only implicitly stated in "Projective Verse." Indeed, Olson himself 
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saw "Human Universe" as the central foundation for his ideas on poetry, philosophy, 
language, and culture. He called the essay the "base," "body," and "substance" of his 
"faith" (Olson, Letters for Origin 69). As such, "Human Universe" provides the necessary 
detail for Olson's unique syntactical experiments in poetry and prose. However, 
"Projective Verse" is still the most effective description of what Olson means by 
postmodem prosody. It is within this piece that he clearly demarcates the differences 
between a projectivism that is "projectile, percussive, and prospective" and a closed verse 
which is none of these things (Selected Writings 15). Like "Human Universe," "Projective 
Verse," is also a necessary template with which to understand his poetry and prose. 
Olson's projectivism is by no means limited to his poetry, and even in the visual 
representation of the 1950 essay, with its shorthand and characteristically atypical breaks 
and bracketing, we can see that it too is projective. It should be noted that Olson's writing 
- whether poetry or prose - is always following the syntactical rules first set out in 
''Projective Verse" to some extent. It can also be said that Olson becomes more projective 
as he develops; this can be seen in the progression of his writing from 1950's "Projective 
Verse" through to Proprioception and The Maximus Poems. 
In the second section of "Projective Verse," and continuing into "Letter to Elaine 
Feinstein," which has subsequently become attached to the end ofProjective Verse in the 
influential collections The Selected Writings of Charles Olson (1966) and Collected Prose: 
Charles Olson (1997), Olson begins to develop the "why'' behind his projective project. 
Here Olson criticizes the Hellenistic tradition and its dissemination of logos as ''word as 
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thought" for the first time (21 ). It is a philosophical position that attempts to explain his 
projective project in poetry and prose, and it continues more explicitly in later works like 
Human Universe (1967), The Special View of History (1970), andMuthologos (1979). 
The anti-Hellenistic stance that Olson adopts in these polemical writings becomes a 
recurring theme in his thoughts on poetry, philosophy, history, and pedagogy. It is also an 
extraordinarily similar position to Martin Heidegger' s in his later writings, particularly 
those concerned with the nature of language, and this explains why there have been many 
Heideggerean readings of Olson's poetry and prose.9 The most notable of these studies 
are Paul Bove's Destructive Poetics: Heifiegger and Modem American Poetry (1980), 
William Spanos' "Charles Olson and Negative Capability: A Phenomenological 
Interpretation" (1980), and most recently, Judith Halden-Sullivan's The Topology of 
Being: The Poetics of Charles Olson (1991). However, it must be said that Olson's 
argument is often marred by a serious lack of critical detail that must necessarily 
accompany any serious criticism of post-Socratic Greek philosophy. This is perhaps 
another reason why critics have turned to Heidegger in Olson studies. 
However, regardless of Olson's lack of analytical rigor in his criticism of Greek 
philosophy, it can be posited that much of Olson's work marks a definitive break with neo-
9Jt should be noted that Martin Heidegger's philosophy, like Olson's poetics, represents a 
definitive break with the logocentric discourse of philosophy as we commonly understand 
it. Heidegger' s writings cannot properly be assimilated into the canon of the discipline 
because they rebel against it. Where there is rigidly logical philosophical investigations 
there is the "anti-logic" ofHeidegger's "mysticism." Here, I am arguing that Heidegger, 
unlike Spinoza et al, is a very projective philosopher. 
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classical and pre-modem conceptions of poetry. Olson's poetry, prose, and interviews 
often critique the poetic a priori, and Western culture as obsolete thought-structures. 
Interestingly, however, much of Olson's argument hinges upon his translation of the Greek 
concept logos, particularly the consequences it holds for the way we understand and use 
language. The next chapter attempts to provide the details that Olson often avoids in his 
critique of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. This necessarily includes a discussion of Olson's 
unique notion of discourse, how it depends upon a reevaluation of logos, and how this is 
perhaps the main unifying philosophical idea in Olson's work. 
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Chapter3 
3.1 Introduction 
Within a year of the publication of"Projective Verse," in February 1951, Charles 
Olson moved from Washington D.C., to Lerma, Mexico, for six months, partly to recover 
from the death ofhis mother (Christensen 18). Here Olson began an intensive 
correspondence with both Cid Corman, editor of Origin magazine, one of the first 
dedicated to the avant-garde poetry movement associated with Black Mountain College, 
and continued his correspondence with Robert Creeley.10 It is from these letters that 
several significant literary projects, particularly the essay "Human Universe" and Mayan 
Letters (1953), were first conceived.U 
''Projective Verse" is where the process by which Olson struggles to free his own 
mind from Western philosophy takes shape as a new view of the world, but it is in the 
essay ''Human Universe" that this view becomes more apparent. As such, these two 
works should be viewed as two parts of a greater movement that is more than just a 
poetical or a philosophical statement: it is a reevaluation of the very foundations of our 
10See the photographs between pages 112 and 113 in Paul Christensen's Charles Olson: 
Call Him Ishmael (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979). Here, Christensen 
acknowledges that "Cid Corman was the backbone of the Black Mountain movement in 
the early years with his magazine Origin, which helped launch Olson and the figures of 
his circle." 
11Mayan Letters, consists of Olson's letters to Robert Creeley while Creeley was living in 
Mallorca, and Olson in Lerma. It was originally published by Divers Press (Mallorca, 
1953). 
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place in existence. 
Beginning with "Projective Verse" and ''Human Universe," and continuing through 
his later poetry and prose, Olson is characteristically struggling to come to terms with his 
role within a postmodern, dialectical shift that intentionally moves away from the 
foundations of Western thought. The problem, for Olson, is that Western metaphysics 
caused a disproportionate emphasis upon the discriminating and logical side oflanguage as 
opposed to the more chaotic and natural side, more akin to the "rules" of live speech 
(Selected Writings 54). Olson's position against Western metaphysics hinges upon his 
assertion that the dissemination of post-Socratic philosophy ushered in the milieu of 
literacy and with it the idea of a logically structured language system.12 
In the closing pages of ''Projective Verse" it is obvious that Olson is against the 
standard rules of syntax and grammar he feels we have inherited from Greek and Latin 
models: ''the conventions which logic has forced on syntax," he says, "must be broken 
open" (Selected Writings 21). In "Human Universe," Olson is attempting to explain in 
more detail the significance of his projective project and why it is necessary for him to 
break with the Greek metaphysical tradition. As a poet interested in positing a new 
formulation of poetic language, Olson realizes that his critique of the Western 
metaphysical tradition must begin with the re-examination of discourse founded on 
12See the last part of Plato's Phaedrus in The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the 
Letters, ed., Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1961), 475-525, for a discussion about the epistemic break that occurred when 
written language displaced the spoken. 
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humanist ideals. 
Interestingly, twelve years after ''Human Universe" was written Olson recognized 
through his reading of Eric Havelock's Preface to Plato (1963) much of his argument 
against Greek metaphysics actually focused on what Havelock explained as "the 
Separation of the Knower from the Known" (Olson, Collected Prose 355-9; Havelock 
198). This concept is how Havelock refers to the revolutionary change that occurred with 
the appearance of Socrates toward the end of the fifth century B. C. This phenomenon was 
the "counterpart of the rejection of oral culture" (Havelock 233), and it was, in Olson's 
view, the start of the separation between the human universe and the discursive universe. 
Much like Olson, Martin Heidegger also investigated the nature of the Greek 
metaphysical tradition in his later writings, particularly in An Introduction to Metaphysics 
(1959). There are affinities between Olson and Heidegger's critique of Greek 
metaphysics, and this accounts for several Heideggerean studies on Olson, such as William 
Spanos' "Charles Olson and Negative Capability: A Phenomenological Interpretation" 
(1980), Paul Bove' s Destructive Poetics: Heidegger and Modem American Poetry 
(1980), and Judith Halden-Sullivan's The Topology of Being: The Poetics of Charles 
Olson (1991). 
Olson's argument against Western metaphysics is present in both his poetry and 
prose. Although excerpts from The Maximus Poems are used occasionally to show that 
Olson's poetry and prose are extensions of the same project, this chapter is not an attempt 
to deal in detail with the massive structure of Olson's long poem. Rather, it is an 
investigation of Olson's critique of the Western metaphysical tradition, beginning with 
"Human Universe" as the focal point of his critique. The discussion then provides an 
analysis of the connection between Olson and Heidegger' s projects. The chapter 
concludes with a reading of "La Torre," one of Olson's first poems to critique the 
Western tradition. 
3.2 Socrates, or "Old Stink Sock" 
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In Olson's view, Socratic philosophy was the beginning of a deliberate invention of 
a false episteme that became characterized by its ''belief in a dialectic of Socrates' order," 
and a new sense of metaphor which became fully manifested in Aristotle as "a part or 
parcel of the Plato-Socrates generalization system, species genus and analogy, similarity 
and contiguousness, including - let it be emphasized - the periodic sentence" (Collected 
Prose 355). In ''Human Universe" Olson insists that around 450 B.C. a general 
preoccupation with generalization, logic, classification, and idealism all begin to dominate 
Greek language and thought (54-5). This discursive bias toward logos, which Olson had 
previously defined as ''word as thought" in ''Projective Verse" (Selected Writings 21 ), 
corrupted our concept and use oflanguage as a speech act (Selected Writings 54-5). 
In Olson's thought logos is interchangeable with the term discourse, and it is 
diametrically opposed to the notion of speech as act. Olson's conception of discourse is 
quite different :from other modem notions of discourse, such as those ofBakhtin in The 
Dialogic Imagination, and Foucault in The Order of Things and The Archaeology of 
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Knowledge, where the term "discourse" often refers to the speech act. With Olson, 
discourse is not seen as being heavily dominated by the speech-force element oflanguage. 
Rather, discourse is seen as inordinately formed by logic and structure. The result of post-
Socratic metaphysical discourse is an unnatural and arbitrarily man-made discursive bias 
that reveals that "language's other function, speech, seems so in need of restoration" 
(Selected Writings 54). 
In a 1956 seminar at Black Mountain College Olson specifically describes the 
moment when Socratic philosophy replaced the human universe (which becomes the 
mythological in his later work) with the rational: 
But you will see what happened the moment the mythological [human universe] 
was displaced by the rational (date, sometime around 440 B.C. Socrates) but 
datable back from that date to some point inside and after Heraclitus ... because 
the will and culture was always ready to put out the light (any one of us has the 
danger to sleep), if you do what the rational does - to seek one explanation - or to 
put it more evenly, undo the paradox (the rational mind hates the familiar, and has 
to make it ordinary by explaining it, in order not to experience it), you can easily 
see why the West has been halved [into subject and object and the human and 
discursive universes], and each of the persons in it for nigh unto two and a half 
millennia. 
(The Special View of History 31) 
In the seminar, which subsequently became part of The Special View of History (1970), 
Olson described the epistemic rupture that occurred when Socrates began questioning 
knowledge systems and systems of experience that had previously existed. The 
development of Socratic dialectic and its eventual widespread dissemination, in Olson's 
mind, severed humanity from what it had originally known, and in its place a totally new 
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system of thought arose, one that was based on an otherworldly and intangible idealism. 
In going back through the history ofWestern metaphysics, Olson offers 450 B.C., 
roughly the year Socrates began teaching his dialectical philosophy, as the moment when 
logos, or "word as thought"(Selected Writings 21), took hold of the Western mind, 
forever changing the nature of epistemological enquiry. Prior to this time, Greek thought, 
particularly in the area of philosophy, was more concerned with investigating phenomena 
as such because a systematic study of the phenomenal world had yet to be developed. The 
rigid system oflogical deduction, dialectic, and idealism that began to manifest itself more 
prominently with the appearance of Socrates was not as prevalent in the less systematic 
thinkers of pre-Socratic Greece. However, in the progression of pre-Socratic thought 
from Anaximander (ca. 610-ca. 546 B.C.) to Heraclitus (fl. 500 B.C.) and Parmenides (fl. 
ca. 485 B.C.?), Greek philosophy moves from a general enquiry into the infinite, or 
indefinite, fundamental principle of the world (Anaximander's apeiron), toward a 
distinction between knowledge and belie( and being and nothingness (Parmenides' 
investigation of the one and the many, knowledge and justice). 
Interestingly, Olson sees pre-Socratic Greek philosophy as belonging to a time that 
was the opposite of Socrates' generalizing discourse. With the appearance of Socrates 
there also came a loss of an original wholeness when language was tied to its referents 
(Kuberski 179). However, it must be said that Olson's critique ofWestern metaphysics is 
not a new approach within American literature; according to Kuberski, there is a recurrent 
pattern in American literature to try and establish new discourses as a return to original 
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truths (17 5). Olson's attempt to establish his "human" universe as an older one with links 
to older truths that existed before Socrates is also what Riddel has referred as "going back 
to come forward" (162). This concept of"going back to come forward" explains why 
Olson uses Heraclitus, a philosopher who emphasized the notion of flux, as opposed to 
Socrates, whose philosophy emphasized stasis. Olson returns to Heraclitus because he is 
an important figure in opposing Socratic philosophy. It is Heraclitus who helps Olson 
formulate the notion of estrangement that he believes results from the post-Socratic 
division of the human and discursive universes (The Special View of History 15; The 
Marimus Poems 52). 
For Charles Olson, a modem thinker fascinated by what he saw as an innate fallacy 
within the Greek philosophical tradition, the movement from pre-Socratic philosophical 
investigation to Socratic dialectic is analogous to a movement of thought conceived 
through "language as the act of the instant" to thought conceived through "language as the 
act of thought about the instant" (Human Universe 4). Before Socrates, we had no need 
for the mediation of logical reasoning to render this experience in language. After 
Socrates, however, logic and reason dominate language and thought, and poetry and 
speech become less kinetic and less projective. Hence, in Olson's view, our original, pre-
Socratic understanding of poetry and speech becomes estranged from us by the logocentric 
bias of post-Socratic thought. 
Indeed, Olson thought that Socrates' "readiness to generalize, his willingness (from 
his own bias) to make a ''universe" out of discourse instead ofletting it rest in its most 
83 
serviceable place" (Human Universe 4), led directly to logos and reason becoming final 
philosophy, or, in Kantian terms an end-in-itself Logos and reason should have remained 
on equal terms with poetry and speech; they should have remained as a means to an end, 
instead ofbeing elevated to an arbitrarily important level ("the Greeks went on to declare 
all speculation as disclosed in a 'UNIVERSE of discourse'") ( 4). From Olson's theory it 
follows that if one aspect of the language dichotomy becomes drastically privileged over 
another, one part of the dichotomy will, in a sense, atrophy: 
We stay unaware how two means of discourse the Greeks appear to have invented 
hugely intermit our participation in our experience, and so prevent discovery. They 
are what followed from Socrates .... It is not sufficiently observed that logos, and 
the reason necessary to it, are only a stage which a man must master and not what 
they are taken to be, final discipline. Beyond them is direct perception and the 
contraries which dispose of argument. The harmony of the universe, and I include 
man, is not logical, or better, is post-logical, as is the order of any created thing. 
(Selected Writings 54-5). 
Olson's human universe, which is really a Romantic state of unmediated experience 
through direct sensory perception, poetry, and speech, became illegitimized as an 
important part of discovering and understanding. As a result, thought and action are so 
interfered with that Olson's concept of the post-logical harmony of the universe cannot be 
experienced. 
For Olson, the direct problems that result from post-Socratic epistemology are that 
man has settled for too little knowledge, and, as a result, definition follows discovery too 
quickly (Human Universe 3). Indeed, although it is impossible to avoid being subjective 
on any leveL Olson felt definition had become as dominant a part of discovery as sensation 
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(3). In other words, we have become both "the instrument of discovery and the instrument 
of definition" (3). By becoming the instrument of discovery and definition we continue to 
perpetuate humanistic modes of thinking and structures of language (grammar, syntax, 
rhyme scheme, etc.). Therefore, Olson must examine language in its "present condition" 
as the vehicle of this discourse that allows one aspect of language (logos) to dominate the 
other (speech) (3). It follows that if a balance can be achieved whereby the nonrational, 
projective, "shout"oflanguage can be restored to an equal position with logos, then maybe 
the metaphysical sins ofWestem humanism can be first exposed and eliminated. For 
Olson restoring the spoken haJf of the language dichotomy necessarily involves a critique 
ofWestem metaphysics and this characterizes him as a postmodernist (Kellogg 63; 
Butterick, "Postmodem" 7). 
3.3 Plato the "Honey-Head" 
In "Human Universe" Olson also attacks Plato for his ''world of Ideas, of forms as 
extricable from content" because they are as dangerous to the human universe as 
Aristotle's logic and classification (Human Universe 5). Platonic idealism, with its 
emphasis on the superiority of reason over imagination, and the dependence of the 
phenomenal world on a world of forms is nothing less than what Olson wanted to 
eradicate in ''Projective Verse" and ''Human Universe." More specifically, Olson's critique 
centers on Plato's idealistic philosophy that distinguishes between two worlds of existence: 
the temporal and immediate reality of the physical world; and the eternal and perfect world 
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of forms. For Plato, knowledge and experience of this world are inevitably transitory 
because we are mired in the trap of our fluctuating passions and appetites. All things 
within the realm of the physical world, therefore, are merely lesser representations of their 
perfect and otherwordly form. Knowledge and experience of the world of forms, 
however, is completely the opposite: it is eternal and it is the highest truth. More 
importantly for Olson, however, is avoiding what Plato's idealism ultimately causes: an 
overemphasis of form over content, which plays a major role in separating the human 
universe from the universe of discourse. Plato's idealistic metaphysics is yet another 
example for Charles Olson of how the ''whole Greek system" has carved up and divided 
the human universe (5). 
In Olson's view, the very presence of a world of forms relegates the status of our 
physical existence in this world to an inferior position. Olson felt that we did not need 
Plato's notion of form because "built in is the connection, in each of us, to Cosmos, and if 
one taps, via psyche, plus a 'true' adherence ofMuse [''the Muse ('world"], one does 
reveal 'Form"'(Human Universe 91). Concepts of form do not come from the heavens, 
but rather from the inspiration of the individual mind. Furthermore, Olson also explicitly 
blames Plato for the transformation of logos as speech act to logic and reason (ratio). In a 
lecture from 1968 Olson says "I want you all to realize that the word logos, or logical has 
been ruined without your knowing it in your experience ... . ";logos was originally part of 
the larger concept of muthologos that included both muthos or mouth, and logos 
(Muthologos 2: 37-8). Olson states this more clearly in "Letter 23" ofhisMaximus 
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sequence: 
... Plato 
allowed this divisive 
thought to stand, agreeing 
thatmuthos 
is false. Logos 
isn't -was facts .... 
(The Maximus Poems 100) 
Perhaps Olson's aversion to Plato came from his immersion in Melville, who saw 
Plato as a "honey-head ... treacherous to all ants," or would-be-idealists (Human Universe 
5). Plato, Olson said during a 1968 interview with Alisdair Clayre, which was 
subsequently broadcast on the BBC in the summer of 1969,13 was "frightened of the arts 
sharing the center of the curriculum with philosophy and mathematics and sculpture and 
dance. He's scared of the dogmatism and the absolutism ofart."14 In another interview 
that touches upon Plato's philosophy Olson says " ... in The Republic in general but I 
think in the tenth book in particular - Plato drives the poets out, including Homer and 
13See Charles Olson, Muthologos: The Collected Lectures and Interviews, Volume II, 
Edited by George F. Butterick (Bolinas: Four Seasons Foundation, 1979), 80. 
14Charles Olson, quoted in Robert von Hallberg's Charles Olson: The Scholar's Art 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 17. 
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Hesiod, from the education and the preparation of people for society and civilization" 
(Muthologos 2: 80). Similarly, in the sixth book of the Republic Plato (through the voice 
of Socrates), uses the metaphor of a line to explain his theories ofknowledge, form, 
education, and the state. The line itself symbolizes a vertical movement upwards from the 
lowest form of perception (imagination) to the highest form (true knowledge or 
understanding), and represents the division between sensate perception and the knowledge 
of things through reason. By placing imagination at the bottom of his line and reason at 
the top, Plato clearly separates the creative arts and poetry, perhaps his most often used 
example of the irrational, from philosophy and logic:" ... the poetic man also uses names 
and phrases to color each of the arts. He himself doesn't understand; but he imitates in 
such a way as to seem ... "he says, because "[t]he maker of the phantom [the poet], the 
imitator, we say, understands nothing of what is but rather of what looks like it is. Isn't 
that so?" (Allan Bloom 283-4). As translated, Plato's view states that sensation, 
perception, imagination, and poetry are inferior modes of experience and it is only through 
reason and logic that true knowledge can be obtained. Consequently, poetry and the 
creative arts are removed from any prominent position within the Republic because they 
would undermine the importance of reason and logic. 
Understandably, Olson's poetic has been seen as being both a struggle against the 
''Western tradition" and a critique ofPlatonic metaphysics partly because Olson attempts to 
reverse the idealism represented in Plato's line and cave analogies (Butterick, 
"Postmodem" 7; Kellogg 63; Doria 138). Much like Shelley's argument in ''Defence of 
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Poetry," Olson reverses the position of Plato's line by emphasizing the importance of 
poetry and imagination over reason and logic because Olson believes this reversal will 
achieve a balance between logos and speech, restoring us to our once familiar human 
universe. One can see Olson's transposition of Platonic idealism when he describes a 
similar situation to Plato's cave analogy in his 1964 poem, "The Lamp," except that here 
the images being projected are those on a cinema screen. The cave dwellers are now 
movie goers locked in the darkness of their imagination, watching images move on the 
screen, creating their own notions of form from their own content. For Olson, this 
"darkness" is a completely natural and beneficial state of perception. Indeed, in direct 
opposition to Plato, Olson thinks it is possible for the subject to "know" the image 
without knowledge ofPlatonic forms because one's own individual perception constructs 
form. Olson's reliance on "poetic logic" as opposed to the discursive logic ofPlato's 
rational thought is an attack on what Olson sees as Plato's false assumption that "teleology 
of form [is] progressive," because for Olson it is only content that is dynamic and 
progressive (Altieri 174; Olson, Special View of History 48). 
You can hurry the pictures toward you but 
there is that point that the whole thing itself 
may be a passage, and that your own ability 
may be a factor in time, in fact that 
only if there is a coincidence of yourself 
& the [human] universe is there then in fact 
an event. Otherwise - and surely here the cinema 
is large- the auditorium can be showing 
all the time. But the question is 
how you yourself are doing, if you in fact 
are equal, in the sense that as a like power 
you also are there when the lights 
go on. This wld [sic] seem to be a 
matter of creation, not simply 
the obvious matter, creation 
itself ... 
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("The Lamp,"Collected Poems 614) 
In Plato's philosophy, knowledge of an image in fact represents false knowledge or 
imagination. For Plato the highest mode of knowledge is not imagination or opinion but 
understanding or intellection. From Olson's projective stance, however, the opposite is 
true: reason must first be mastered in order to understand imagination (Human Universe 
4). Continuing Shelley's argument that began with the ''Defence ofPoetry," Olson sees 
reason, logic and classification as only the most rudimentary stage in understanding 
experience, because for him real knowledge is post-logical (Human Universe 5; Shelley 
503). 
Perhaps the main unifying idea in the progression of Olson's prose is his insistence 
that the appearance of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle beginning around 450 B.C. began a 
tyranny of linguistic laws that made logos a language unto its own, fostering the discursive 
methods oflogical formulation and classification through a disproportionate emphasis 
upon logos in conceptions oflanguage and poetry (Christensen 51). However, Olson's 
argument against Plato's ''world ofideas" with its "forms as extricable from content" has 
also been seen as "strangely Platonic" and therefore guilty of idealism (Olson, Selected 
Writings 55; Kuberski 181). Olson's critique ofPlato in ''Human Universe" is an 
extension of his argument against formalism in ''Projective Verse," where he states that 
"FORM IS NEVER MORE THAN AN EXPRESSION OF CONTENT'' (Selected 
Writings 17). In ''Projective Verse" Olson does not critique the source ofhis argument 
against formalism, but in "Human Universe" he traces it back to Plato's world of forms. 
Olson's reversal ofPlato's conception of form is not a way out ofidealism, but rather a 
substitution ofPlato's idealism for his own: the idea that an original language existed 
which was then lost or corrupted by the domination of logos is a common Romantic 
conception of the loss of an "original wholeness" (Kuberski 179). 
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In the second part of"Human Universe" Olson's idealism continues when he offers 
an idyllic account of his experience with the descendants of the Maya in Mexico as a 
"civilization anterior'' (Creeley, A Quick Graph 159) to Ancient Greece. Olson saw the 
Maya as the perfect embodiment of a culture that retained the balance between speech act 
as the "act of the instant" and logical discourse as the "act of thought about the instant" in 
their hieroglyphic language (Selected Writings 54). Olson was obviously impressed with 
the way the Mayans invented a language that retained ''the power over objects of which 
they are images," their domestication of maize ("one of the world's wonders") and the way 
they carried their bodies. Olson makes huge generalizing assumptions about the Maya in 
order to provide himself with an "alternative to a generalising humanism" that he saw in 
Greek metaphysics (Creeley, A Quick Graph 159). Indeed, Olson typically abandons 
logical facts and argumentative analysis when it suits his own needs. Although Olson 
offers an alternative to formalism and idealism in his critique of Plato, Olson can be fairly 
criticized for overt generalizations and naive assumptions that undermine his project. 
Although some Heideggerean Olson scholars such as Bove in Destructive Poetics: 
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History and Interpretation in Heidegger and Modem Poetry and Spanos in "Charles 
Olson and Negative Capability: A Phenomenologocal Interpretation" have insisted that 
Olson's project is concerned with the "destruction of the Western [metaphysical] tradition" 
(Spanos 75), it is better to see Olson's project as an attempt to break with the tradition of 
Western metaphysics than it is an attempt to destroy it because Olson himself occasionally 
falls victim to the Platonic idealism that he wishes to eradicate and cannot be seen, 
therefore, as offering a destruction of or solution to Plato's idealist philosophy. 
3.4 Aristotle, or "Hairystottle" 
For Olson, Aristotle's influence as a philosopher has only further added to the 
marginalization of poetry and speech as reliable forms for understanding perception and 
experience in Western thought. Even in a later work, Olson mockingly refers to the 
philosopher as "Hairystottle," humorously undercutting Aristotle's prominent position in 
Western history (The Special View of History 40). Indeed, in a simplistic way, the 
progression ofWestern thought can be seen as merely adding to the habits of logic and 
classification generated by Aristotle in such works as the Organon15, where he was the 
first to develop a form oflogical argumentation based upon the syllogism. 16 This kind of 
150rganon is the collective name for the body of Aristotle's work that deals specifically 
with logic and thought as the instruments of knowledge. The Organon comprises The 
Categories, The Prior and Posterior Analytics, The Topics, and On Interpretation. 
16The most famous syllogism is based upon the facts that (a) all people are mortal and (b) 
Socrates is a person, therefore: (c) Socrates is mortal. 
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reasoning is based upon comparison, which along with symbology, Olson blames for 
hiding and rendering the active (kinetic) intellectual states of metaphor and performance 
unusable (Human Universe 6). Olson denies the impottance of description; comparison, 
and symbology as literary motifs because they ultimately deny, in his view of Whitehead's 
nature as process, the continual process of reality. 
Olson specifically criticizes Aristotle for providing the "two great means" oflogic 
and classification that "have so fastened themselves on habits of thought" that they prevent 
thought as the act of the instant (Human Universe 5). Aristotle's thought emphasized 
logical inference and classification, a distinction between form and matter, as well as four 
kinds of causes: material, efficient, formal, and final. Aristotle contributed much to the 
dominance of the syntactical sentence within the logically structured rule system of 
language. For Olson, however: 
There are no hierarchies, no infinite, no such many as mass, there are only 
eyes in all heads, 
to be looked out of 
(The Maximus Poems 29) 
Furthermore, any thing at any given time can only be understood through its self-existence 
because only something that exists through itself can become meaningful (Muthologos 1: 
129). Therefore, analogy, comparison, and symbology necessarily fail as literary 
techniques and techniques of discovery because they deny the very fact of a thing's self-
existence by attempting to understand it through something else. 
All that comparison ever does is set up a series of reference points: to compare is 
to take one thing and try to understand it by marking its similarities to or 
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differences from another thing. Right here is the trouble, that each thing is not so 
much like or different from another thing .... but that such an analysis 
[comparison and classification] only accomplishes a description, does not come to 
terms with what really matters: that a thing, any thing, impinges on us by a more 
important fact, its self-existence, without reference to any other thing . . .. This is 
what we are confronted by, not the thing's 'class,' any hierarchy, of quality or 
quantity, but the thing itset:t: and its relevance to ourselves who are the experience 
ofit ... 
(Human Universe 6) 
In Olson's view, the monocultural dominant of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition 
has prevented humans from directly experiencing and engaging the world. We must 
restore speech to its rightful place within the language dichotomy if we are to begin to 
undo the effect Hellenistic logocentrism has had on our perception and language. Indeed, 
for Olson's projective philosophy (objectism), description, and definition are not valid 
because they ultimately neglect the self-existence of the thing in question In other words, 
because of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Olson feels "we do not find ways to hew to 
experience as it is, in our definition and expression of it," or "find ways to stay in the 
human universe, and not be led to partition reality at any point, in any way'' (Human 
Universe 5). Indeed, we have allowed comparison, description, and classification to 
dominate our perception through their influence on Western thought, but for Olson it is 
also a 
... question of re-establishing a concept of knowledge as culture rather than what's 
wrong with the schools, I mean that already anyone who wants to begin to get 
straight has to, to start, a straight man has to un-educate himself first, in order to 
begin to pick up, to take up, you get back, in order to get on. 
(Human Universe 11) 
Ultimately, analytical categories like description, comparison, and simile filter and distort 
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sensory experience, rendering them incapable of grasping the process and self-formation of 
the things in question. 
Perhaps the most obvious example oflogic and classification that Olson repeatedly 
returned to was Aristotle's influence on grammar, and particularly how this grammar 
affects poetry. The very notion of having a logically structured language system that 
emphasizes the form of how we say something over what we are saying indicates, from a 
projective stance, that imposing grammatical form upon the content of our ideas directly 
contributes to a loss of energy. Grammatical structures directly result in language that is 
"the act of thought about the instant" (Selected Writings 54), and as such they slow down 
the initial kinetic inspiration that often characterizes Olson's language. 
An example of Olson's rebellion against Aristotelian grammatical form can be seen 
in his refusal to adhere to the dominance that syntax exerts in logically structured 
language. The sentence is commonly understood to be formed by both noun and predicate 
and it must express a complete thought. For Olson, however, the sentence is "a transfer of 
force, from object to object by verb" so that the ''very act of the sentence is the dynamic 
which matters" (The Special View of History 45). Aristotelian hierarchy and classification 
divided reality into subject and object and substance and quality which from Olson's 
projective view, prevents the expression of our immediate actions (Whitehead 68; von 
Hallberg, "Olson, Whitehead, and the Objectivists" 93). Therefore, Olson concludes that 
in order to bring about the dynamic ofFenellosa's concept of the sentence as an energy 
transfer "one has to go back to the original noun-verb terms [the pre-Aristotelian notion 
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of noun and verb where the verb is more active and less cognitive]'' (The Special View of 
History 45). This is why Olson offered a projective verse to counteract the division of 
subject and predicate, and substance and quality, that he found in non-projective syntax. 
As he did in his critique ofPlato, Olson based much of his argument against 
Aristotle on the Romantic idea of a golden era that existed before Socrates, Plato, and 
Aristotle, an era that was characterized by a discourse that was "oral," "whole," and 
eventually "lost" (Kuberski 187). This is yet another example of Olson's idealistic critique 
of Greek philosophy. Some years after writing his critique of Western metaphysics in 
"Human Universe," however, Olson became further convinced from reading Eric 
Havelock's Preface to Plato (1963) that after the advent of Socrates and Plato, 
particularly with Aristotelian notions of grammar, Greek language became more structured 
around nouns and verbs of cognition as opposed to verbs of action (Olson, Collected 
Prose 355-8; Havelock 197-201). 
Indeed, in "The Kingfishers" Olson plays with the reader's expectations of what 
poetic language is "supposed" to do. Olson relies heavily on digressions, allusions to other 
languages, and the dislocation of word order, all of which undermine the norms of 
syntactical rules (Butterick, "Postmodem'' 19-21). 
What does not change I is the will to change 
He woke, fully clothed, in his bed. He 
remembered only one thing, the birds, how 
when he came in, he had gone around the rooms 
and got them back in their cage, the green one first, 
she with the bad leg, and then the blue, 
the one they had hoped was male 
I thought of theE on the stone, and of what Mao said 
la lumiere" 
but the kingfisher 
de 1' aurore" 
but the kingfisher flew west 
est devant nous! 
I am no Greek, hath not th' advantage 
And of course, no Roman: 
he can take no risk that matters, 
the risk of beauty least of all 
It is only because I have interested myself 
in what was slain in the sun . . . . 
96 
(Collected Poems 86-7, 92-3). 
Immediately in "The Kingfishers" we are aware of Olson's position that language 
must be freed from syntax, and there is a certain irony in the way Olson plays with our 
expectations of syntactical principles. The message of the poem is also an important 
example of what Creeley has referred to as the clearest indication of Olson's "need to 
break with the too simple westernisms of a 'greek culture"' (Creeley, A Quick Graph 159) 
that is now dead: "I pose you your question: I shall you uncover honey I where maggots 
are? I I hunt among stones" (Olson, Collected Poems 93). The ideas expressed in the last 
section of"The Kingfishers" mirror Olson's 1963 comments on Havelock's Preface to 
Plato: "[t]here is a discourse. There is a grammar. There is a sentence you do have. It 
happens also to be a motive of things that you are not" (Collected Prose 358). There is 
nothing for Olson to discover in post-Socratic Greek philosophy anymore ("shall you 
uncover honey I where maggots are?), and so Olson searches in cultures that he believes 
are the antecedent of Greek culture, like the Mayans and Sumerians, for his answers ("I 
hunt among stones"). 
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Although Olson can be blamed for being an idealist when he says things like "the 
literal is an invention of language and .... Truth lies solely in what you do with it. And 
that means you" (Causal Mythology 36), he does, however, place the blame of idealism's 
presence in our language and thought squarely upon Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. 
"[T]ruth is only a true thought," he says, "[b ]y which statement I believe I also make 
evident why truth is not what [it was when it] unfortunately got stuck ... in our craws 
since Socrates, Plato, and the one, of all, Hairystottle. It ain't at all absolute. It is 
fortunately dynamic .. . "(The Special View of History 40). So it is that Olson's poetry 
and prose leave meanings open to interpretation while compounding the kinetics of the 
ideas expressed in the language with ellipses, commas, and a heavy use of prepositions: it 
is part of his argument against post-Socratic metaphysics. What follows is that since the 
projective world is not a logically structured entity, and therefore not analogous to 
syntactical order, a poetry that reflects a kinetic fluctuating world must also be post-logical 
and continually in process. 
3.5 The (ln)Significance of Logos: Olson and Heidegger 
As mentioned, Olson's argument against the Greek devaluation of the irrational 
and subsequent cultivation of reason and logic shares similarities with the philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger as part of the "expression of the universal postmodem quest for an 
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alternative decentered modality of knowledge to the privileged logocentric "humanistic" 
orientation of the Western tradition" (Spanos 39-40). Like Olson's objectism and 
projective verse, Heidegger' s phenomemology is a philosophy that seeks to "reinstate the 
primacy of the organism in the act of perceiving"( Christensen 45). Both Olson and 
Heidegger see that achieving a return to direct perception requires a reevaluation of post-
Socratic epistemology, which is preventing immediate perception by enclosing "language 
within an absolute uniform system" (Spanos 41). 
Both Heidegger and Olson see inherent problems in Greek philosophy, and both 
see these problems as impinging on our ideas of thought generally, and language 
particularly. Olson's poetry is rooted in the idea that the poem is constructed from objects 
taken as they are found in nature and then captured by the poet's adherence to an ego-less 
language. Heidegger would agree with this dictum because he thinks that we impose our 
own constructions upon language far more than is necessary, and this is reminiscent of 
Olson's refusal to allow form to dictate content, which was discussed in more detail in 
Chapters One and Two (see also Spanos 43). In "Projective Verse," Olson described his 
philosophy of objectism as "the getting rid of the lyrical interference of the individual as 
ego" because the individual is merely an object among other objects of nature; there is no 
special hierarchy needed for the concept of the individual (Selected Writings 24). 
Heidegger also relates this idea to his concept of language in works like The Way to 
Language (1971). 
Just as Olson's poetry and his ''Projective Verse," Human Universe, and The 
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Special View of History critique the poetic a priori and Greek abstract philosophy, 
Heidegger' s Poetry, Language, and Thought (1971 ), The Way to Language (1971 ), and 
An Introduction to Metaphysics (1959) critique the foundations of humanism and the 
philosophy oflanguage. Showing Olson's affinity with aspects of Martin Heidegger's 
philosophy only demonstrates the broad range and perceptive scope of Olson's projective 
project, and this is undoubtedly why there have been numerous Heideggerean studies on 
Olson. The most notable work in this area of Olson scholarship has been William Spanos' 
"Charles Olson and Negative Capability: A Phenomenological Interpretation," Paul Bove' s 
Destructive Poetics: Heidegger and Modem American Poetry, and, most recently, Judith 
Halden Sullivan's The Topology of Being: The Poetics of Charles Olson. 
Both Spanos' "Charles Olson and Negative Capability: A Phenomenological 
Interpretation" and Bove' s Destructive Poetics: Heidegger and Modem American Poetry 
attempt to portray Olson as willingly partaking in the "destruction of the Western 
tradition" and have subsequently been referred to as being "destructive" critics (Halden-
Sullivan 28). However, Olson can not be regarded as a wholly "destructive" critic of the 
Western tradition because he too often lapses into Platonic language and idealistic 
solutions to Platonic philosophy. It is therefore more effective to see Olson as a figure 
who actually breaks with the Western tradition, although his vigorous language in his 
various critiques of post-Socratic philosophy indicates he himself would probably prefer to 
be classified as a "destructive" figure. However, one cannot naively accept Olson's own 
word because of the complications inherent in his own argument. 
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Although both Spanos and Bove's work on Olson shares a similar orientation in 
their analysis, Bove can be faulted for being too rash and overzealous in his argument as 
Hald~n-Sullivan correctly suggests (95-7). Bove's motives seem to be more in tune with 
deifying Olson as a rebellious figure who was only interested in destroying an intellectual 
tradition, rather than portraying Olson as someone who attempted to right the wrongs of 
the tradition (Bove 271). 
Although Spanos is more thorough and true to both Olson and Heidegger than 
Bove, he has been falsely criticized for not relying upon Heidegger' s notion of "Being" in 
Being and Time (Halden-Sullivan 95). However, if Spanos were to have relied as heavily 
upon Heidegger's mystical and often unsubstantiated notions of"Being," as Halden-
Sullivan does, then his work would also succumb to an over-usage ofHeideggerean 
terminology that jarringly interrupts Halden-Sullivan's prose. Indeed, Halden-Sullivan's 
non-critical approach to Heidegger' s language and philosophy results in obscuring the later 
Heidegger' s connection to Olson: her argument too often offers only mysteries and 
uncertainties where there should be clarity and focus (see Halden-Sullivan's analysis of 
Heidegger's ''world" the "Open'' and ''Aletheia," 92-129). Furthermore, Halden-Sullivan 
should have realized that one cannot read the early Heidegger' s Being and Time as an 
extended preface to his later work on language and poetry because Heidegger' s later work 
is often an intentional movement away from Being and Time. Regardless of their critical 
approach, however, Spanos and Sullivan (the best work on the Olson-Heidegger affinity) 
agree on a similar focal point for their criticism: the dissemination of the Greek concept of 
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logos and the consequences it holds for the way we understand and use language. 
In his book An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger writes, "let us ... attempt 
to regain the unimpaired strength oflanguage and words; for words and language are not 
wrappings in which things are packed for the commerce of those who write and speak. It 
is in words and language that things first come into being and are" (13). Heidegger, like 
Olson, thinks that language is supposed to be more than a medium for communication or 
rhetoric; both want to make it clear that this is not what is happening in our Western 
application of language. Just as Olson sees a shift in thought occurring with the 
appearance of Socrates, so too does Heidegger. Heidegger makes a distinction between 
the early Greek, pre-Socratic's use oflanguage, which had more immediacy between the 
speaker, the spoken, and the action; and our language, which has lost this sense of 
immediacy and become more passive and distant from the speaker (Introduction to 
Metaphysics 13-14). For Olson and Heidegger, the early Greek's language was simply 
more effective in conveying the existential immediacy of lived experience. Whereas it is 
impossible for modem language to communicate this immediacy because of its inherent 
logocentric bias and reliance upon previously established hierarchical structures of 
symbology, grammar, poetry, and thought (Olson Selected Writings 53-6; Heidegger 
Introduction to Metaphysics 13). 
Olson and Heidegger see the problem as coming directly from our Western 
metaphysical tradition. Both Olson and Heidegger are trying to make the point that 
language is less a solid foundation for logical communication and metaphysics than it is a 
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mystery; language is less a user-friendly, logically structured meaning system than it is an 
entity unto itself For instance, language, particularly poetic language, is often wrought 
with logical inconsistencies, and it is a projective open verse that best embodies this other 
realm oflanguage: "poetry as being written today, especially by or in our language, yields 
a future that is unknown, is so different from assumptions that poetry has bad, in our 
language .. . "(Poetry and Truth 12). Indeed, the arbitrary foundations oflanguage are 
unsolid, in flux, and more chaotic than we often realize because " ... we are moving within 
language, which means moving on shifting ground" (Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? 
43). 
Olson is also trying to mark where, when, and why language is not as projective as 
he thinks it is supposed to be. Olson blames the beginning of Socratic thought as the 
foundation behind a language built on logos, and then tries to tum two thousand years of 
Western culture on its head by criticizing elements of Greek metaphysics that we now take 
for granted as our own. But what exactly is the distinction between the pre-Socratic use 
oflanguage and that of the post-Socratic in Olson's or even Heidegger' s thought? 
The defining point in this distinction rests upon notions that developed around the 
Greek term logos. Both Olson and Heidegger prefer a Heraclitean world of flux to 
Socratic idealism and stasis, which helps their attempt to establish the difference between 
pre-Socratic and post-Socratic logos. When Heidegger says that there is another part of 
language then just logos he is trying to show, as Olson did in ''Human Universe," that 
there is something other to language than reason and order (Introduction to Metaphysics 
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123-7). Language, by its very nature, is not entirely logocentric; language is also 
"overpowering and uncanny," and ''uncontrollable and wholly other"; language is dark and 
mysterious and always just barely out of logos' complete control (Bruns, Heidegger 120). 
Language then is not just logos but is also physis, an ancient Greek term for the 
mysterious and unknown. Heidegger's notion ofphysis is like Olson's projective speech 
act and it is integral to his conception of language that has been lost since post-Socratic 
Greece. Both Olson and Heidegger are trying to make the modem thinker aware of this 
forgotten aspect of language. It may help here to think of philosophical (metaphysical) 
discourse as the height of a closed (non-projective) language governed by logos, and 
poetry as physis, or language that is open to human experience; physis exposes language 
to "the uncanny, estranging it from" the "comfortable fixities" of Greek philosophy (Bruns, 
Heidegger 118). 
With this Heideggerean background, Olson's view that Socrates, Plato, and 
Aristotle forced language to become logos so they could overpower the strange 
waywardness of poetry and speech acquires more philosophical detail than he offers in his 
critique. It is logic and reason that constrained poetry's imaginative or illogical nature. 
But Olson's postmodem poetry remains beyond the complete domination of reason and 
logic -- and therefore of logocentrism -- because it naturally withdraws from this sort of 
analysis. Poetry is somehow other to language as logos because poetry is physis, and this 
is particularly evident in Olson's projective poetry. Simply put, poetry, and I would argue 
particularly a projective, postmodem poetry, shows that language is not just logos and 
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therefore cannot be wholly reducible to it. However, the paradox is that just as there 
could not be projective verse without first having a non-projective verse to rebel against, 
language as logos could not exist if there were not first language as physis, which was then 
"tamed" and constrained into a sensical formula for communication by the post-Socratic 
notion of logos. 
Both Charles Olson and Martin Heidegger also argue that there are fewer divisions 
in reality than Greek epistemology has led us to believe. By constraining language with 
rigid grammatical rules, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle constructed an impossible obstacle 
to understanding the nature of language as something more than just logos or rational 
communication (ratio). In his poetry, prose, and conversations, Olson is advocating a 
conscious refusal of Greek metaphysical discourse that forsakes "the fullness of experience 
for the sake oflogical tidiness" in favor of a "universe of experience" that adheres to the 
flow of events through projective verse (Olson Selected Writings 54-5~ Merrill38). 
Olson's projective stance toward reality also encompasses a unique notion of 
illiteracy in its denial ofHellenism. Just as Olson separated the discursive universe from 
the human universe, and the projective poem from the non-projective, he transposed our 
notions of literacy and illiteracy: to be literate is to be too well-versed and therefore 
dependent on Hellenism, and to be illiterate is to be projective and free from post-Socratic 
metaphysics. 
In a 1959letter to Elaine Feinstein, Olson divulges the "non-literary sense" of his 
projectivism as an example of''the value of the vernacular over grammar," or the 
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colloquial speech act over logos (Selected Writings 27). Indeed, his refusal to allow fonn 
to dominate content is "non-literary'' because it is based on the natural advantages of 
speech rhythms (27). It is because of his emphasis on "illiteracy'' and his distrust of a 
Greek culture that spawned Western civilization that Olson turns to cultures he perceives 
as anterior to our own. However, Olson does not see these cultures as uncivilized in the 
savage, barbarous context that the Ancient Greeks did. Rather, he sees vibrancy and 
freedom in the "grammars" of North American Indians, like the Hopi of the Southwestern 
United States, and the Y ani of Northern California, because they provide him with the 
inspiration to embrace language systems and cultures that do not have the same 
metaphysical foundations or syntactical "hangups" as Western civilization (Selected 
Writings 28). Olson's investigations into non-Western culture demonstrated to him that 
language based on Greek philosophy and grammatical systems slows and impedes 
language as speech. 
In an interview collected in Muthologos, Olson admits that, in his mind, it is "better 
to be, really, illiterate" because it is only possible for the illiterate to truly hear the 
projective speech act, and without this kind of attention to language, poetry and thought 
will remain closed (1 :54). Reorienting the mind to a projective stance involves new ways 
of paying attention to language and not paying attention to the pre-established fonns that 
language arrives in. Therefore, a literacy that depends upon Greek metaphysics for its 
structures of meaning impedes the more natural, free-flowing "illiteracy'' of projectivism. 
To reorient oneself to projectivism necessitates a reorientation of one's own understanding 
of perception, which includes the act of hearing: 
... it's very crucial today ... to be sure that you stay illiterate simply because 
literacy is wholly dangerous, so dangerous that I'm involved, every time I read 
poetry, in the fact that I'm reading to people who are literate - and they are not 
hearing. They may be listening with all their minds, but they don't hear. 
(Muthologos 1:54) 
The people who are listening to and yet not hearing Olson remain in the non-projective 
discursive universe because they are too literate in the same way that T.S. Eliot is too 
"scholastic" in "Projective Verse": 
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Eliot is not projective ... his root is the mind alone, and a scholastic mind at that. . 
. in his listening he has stayed there where the ear and mind are, has only gone from 
his fine ear outward rather than, as I say a projective poet will, down through the 
workings of his own throat .... 
(Selected Writings 26) 
Similarly, Martin Heidegger refers to the difference between people who merely listen, 
those who are "present yet absent," and those who can truly hear (Introduction to 
Metaphysics 130). It is only the poets and thinkers who have questioned Greek 
metaphysics that are able to hear the essence oflanguage. The essence oflanguage shows 
itself as our speech and it is projective: 
Those who are more daring by a breath dare the venture with language. They are 
the sayers who more sayingly say. For this one breath which they are more daring 
is not just a saying of any sort; rather, this one breath is another breath a saying 
other than the rest of human saying. 
(Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought 140) 
The audience that Olson is addressing in Muthologos has not questioned the 
foundations of literacy enough to hear what Olson is saying. They are the ones who are 
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"present yet absent" because they are physically present at the lecture but they are deaf to 
the ideas inherent in projective verse. In The Way to Language, Heidegger makes a 
distinction between speaking and saying that illuminates Olson's point. Here, he says that 
speaking is merely the creation of sounds whereas saying is something quite different: 
"One can speak, speak endlessly, and it may all say nothing. As opposed to that, one can 
be silent, not speak at all, and in not speaking say a great deal" (408). All that idle "talk'' 
ever does is foster an illusion of false understanding by obscuring or holding back critical 
inquiry (Steiner 95). In a similar way, both Heidegger and Olson think Greek philosophy 
has given us a false sense of understanding the world and ourselves while simultaneously 
obscuring its own fallacies. Olson wants to shed light on this overlooked discrepancy in 
his poetry and prose because being literate implies being literate of the Greek tradition that 
has covered over its mistakes, particularly the dominance of logos over speech. 
InMuthologos (1978), Olson explains how intent he is on disrupting the literacy of 
Hellenism. Unfortunately, not everyone is ready for this conceptual adjustment, but they 
must be shocked into it: 
... recently I read at Brandeis and I got so damn offended I backed up against the 
wall and said, "You people are so literate I don't want to read to you any more," 
and stopped. And the moment I said it of course the shock was so great that I 
could read from that point on as long as I chose. Everybody needs to be bumped 
like mad on this point. 
(Muthologos 1:54) 
What Olson is saying to his audience, however, is "a saying other than the rest of human 
saying" (Heidegger Poetry. Language. Thought 140) because the saying questions the 
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''whole shaky edifice"(Christensen 25) of the Greek tradition. The significance of what 
Olson is saying becomes clearer when we see the connotations that speaking has for 
Heidegger. "Speaking" in the Heideggerean sense is equivalent to Olson's "shout" in 
''Projective Verse." The sense of saying in both Olson ("shout") and Heidegger is the 
same as the German "sagan," which means "to point out, to show, to let something 
appear, to let it be seen or heard" (The Way to Language 409). In his poetry, prose, and 
interviews Olson is trying to point the way to projectivism while directing us away from 
what he sees as the fallacies of post-Socratic notions of poetry and philosophy. 
3.6 "La Torre": The "Tower" of Greek Metaphysics 
"La Torre" is one of the first poetic examples of Charles Olson's critique of the 
Western tradition, and it took seven years and numerous revisions from the time the poem 
was first drafted in 1946 to the time it was published in 1953 for Olson to be satisfied with 
it (Foster 44). It is also a poem that is often overlooked in Olson studies, with many 
scholars choosing to rely most heavily upon "The Kingfishers" as the definitive poem in 
the Olson oeuvre. This is perhaps because "The Kingfishers" was the one of the first 
Olson poems to be accepted into the canon of American literature as an important piece of 
twentieth-century American postmodemism, along with his 1950 essay ''Projective Verse." 
However, I believe it is the poem ''La Torre" that comes the closest to representing clearly 
a major aspect of Olson's thought, and perhaps the only potentially unifying notion in all of 
his disparate ideas- the false appropriation of post-Socratic discourse by Western 
109 
philosophy, language, and culture. What proceeds from here is a reading of"La Torre" 
that is based upon William Spanos' assertion that the tower depicted in the poem 
"represents the Western epistemological tradition" (Spanos 76). However, I have 
emphasized the tower as a metaphor for the Western metaphysical tradition where Spanos 
suggests the more limited term epistemology, because the term metaphysics includes 
epistemology as well as ontology and cosmology. 
As this chapter has established, there is an insistent proposition in Olson's work, 
not only in his poems and his essays, but also in his lectures, conversations, letters, and 
notes, that we are at the end of a great historical milieu, one that has been characterized by 
our inheritance, and reliance upon the Greek philosophical tradition. This tradition is the 
foundation for our entire Western humanist tradition, as well: from ideas of poetical form, 
to grammatical rules and rules of syntax, extending even to the basis of scientific thought. 
Greek philosophy, specifically the discourse of this philosophy, has continually prevented 
humanity from directly experiencing the world. In Olson's view, we have allowed the 
discourse of Greek metaphysics, which includes logical formulation and classification, as 
well as symbology, dualism, and idealism, to form a Hellenistic prison around us. 
For Olson the discursive methods of Greek philosophy are the most rudimentary 
means of arranging and sorting experience (Selected Writings 54-55). In order to realize 
this we must first break the dominance Greek metaphysics holds over our tradition of 
knowledge; that is, we must tear down, brick by brick, the tower of Greek metaphysics we 
find ourselves mired in. 
The tower is broken, the house 
where the head was used to lift, 
where awe was ... 
llO 
("La Torre," Collected Poems, 189) 
Olson opens "La Torre" with the speaker witnessing the breach in a tower ("The 
tower is broken"). It is a venerable tower, much respected for its links to our intellectual 
antiquity ("where awe was"), but it is crumbling. And with this disintegration there comes 
fear and exultation. It is a scene that shows a tower being struck and set aflame by 
lightning. However, this tower is, ultimately, the tower of Greek metaphysical philosophy, 
keeper of the "Athenian Three" (Collected Prose 358). The image of this tower becomes 
a metaphor for the boundaries of the human mind, a mind that has locked itself away from 
directly experiencing the world around it. It is Aristotelian grammar and syntax. It is the 
tower of the rational mind; Plato's line analogy as medieval spire; a place where our 
reliance on reason has given us a false sense of our superiority over other objects. But the 
tower is rotting ("It is broken!"), and so too is the thinking that helped construct it. Olson 
discussed his desire to marginalize (decenter) Western metaphysics in a 1968 interview: 
In other words ... it was in the development of the Greek language after Homer 
and Hesiod - in, for example, the invention of the definite article - that 
generalization occurred for the first time in the world. And that such things then 
that Plato and Aristotle invented, or that conversation by Socrates made possible -
and I mean conversation in that bad sense ... at the same early stage as Greek in 
the hands ofHomer and Hesiod was, before the development of these unhappy 
grammatical constructions which made possible logic and classification and the 
whole taxonomy of Aristotle which has had to be destroyed and is being destroyed, 
is slowly coming to pieces as is the present civilization, so that we can get back to 
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ground and then start again. 
(Muthologos 2: 86) 
For Olson, the crumbling tower represents the division, caused by Greek philosophy, 
between the human universe and the universe of discourse. The discursive universe, as we 
have discussed earlier in this chapter, is based upon the dominance of a logically ordered 
"word as thought" language system. There is no room for the projective speech act here; 
the tower has been constructed to keep it outside, to keep it from asserting its own 
dominance. In Olson's thought the "human universe" is post-logical, as are the rest of the 
objects in the phenomenal field (Selected Writings 55). The Western tradition forced 
notions of Aristotelian logic and hierarchical classification upon the human universe, 
turning what was human into what is now discursive (Human Universe 4). The tower is 
also the tower of logos, and logos has become a language unto its own. This "tower" has 
estranged us :from the familiarity of ourselves. It is the place of Socratic dialectic, Platonic 
idealism, and Aristotle's logic and classification. It is the tower Olson feels we must 
abandon if we are to reenter the human universe; and the projective minded are waiting on 
the beach watching the tower implode, listening to the sweet sound and smell of 
destruction: 
(It is broken! 
And the sounds 
are sweet, the air 
acrid, in the night fear 
is :fragrant . . . 
(Collected Poems 189) 
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Here, as in all of Olson's poems, there is a struggle or refusal to adhere to logically 
governed syntactical rules. In the excerpt above, Olson uses parenthesis to set the second 
cluster slightly apart from the rest of the poem. This is not an unusual occurrence in a 
poem by Charles Olson, and the significance in allowing the parenthesis to remain open is 
that it exemplifies, in verse, Olson's desire to allow the poem to resist completeness, to 
remain in a Heraclitean state of flux in order to physically represent his need to abolish the 
fixed syntactic connections of Aristotelian grammar. 
It is ultimately satisfactory for Olson to see the end of post-Socratic metaphysics, 
because "When the structures go, I light I comes through" (Collected Poems 189). With 
the shackles of Greek philosophy erroding, we are better able to see other areas that have 
been estranged from us in their proper context. Greek epistemology has also prevented us 
from acknowledging that we are always simultaneously both subject and object (The 
Special View of History 32). There are fewer divisions in the human universe than the 
discursive, and this is why Olson wants to "establish the double axe or axis as sign" (33): 
he wants to abolish the old static, Platonic notion of one, best demonstrated by Plato's 
unchanging, static, ego-sel:( by destroying it with a projective sign that is both subject and 
object. Again, the presence ofFenellosa's The Chinese Written Character as a Medium 
for Poetry (1936) can be felt here. In order for a transfer of force to occur between 
subject and object in a sentence the separation between subject and object, caused by 
Aristotle's division of substance and quality, must be overcome: 
To begin again. Lightning 
is an axe, transfer 
of force subject to object is 
order: destroy! ... 
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(Collected Poems 189) 
But "To destroy I is to start again" even by "dowsing" the sun out as symbol of Apollo, 
god of centripetal order, and Plato's highest state of reason, in favor of the disordered 
chaos of Heraclitus' ever-changing first principle of fire. Olson wants to extinguish this 
heliotrope of Greek philosophy as surely as he wants to destroy the tower, for they are 
really one and the same. Much like a modern day Copernicus, Olson wants to reorder our 
knowledge in the service of his human universe, where a new humanism will return to us 
what we have long lamented, our estrangement from that with which we were most 
familiar (The Special View of History 15; The Maximus Poems 52) 
To destroy 
is to start again, is a factor of 
sun, fire is 
when the sun is out, dowsed 
Stand clear! Here 
it comes down and with it the heart has 
what was, what was 
we do lament ... 
(To cause the jaws to grind 
before the nostrils flare 
To let breath in 
(Collected Poems 189) 
In "La Torre," Olson seems to be endorsing William Carlos Williams' belief in the 
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creative necessity of destruction (Paul 9). Indeed, the theme of destruction as the 
"beginning of new action and new power" is present throughout the poem (To destroy I is 
to start again) (Foster 44). With the destruction of the Greek metaphysical tower, 
humanity becomes free from divisions of all kinds and is able to reorient itself in a new 
stance toward reality, one that will undoubtedly be projective, because: 
Where there are no walls 
there are no laws, forms, sounds, odors 
to grab hold of 
Let the tower fall! 
Where space is born 
man has a beach to ground on ... 
(Collected Poems 190) 
With the destruction of the tower, we are finally free from the looming presence of a 
priori models of thinking and writing; there is now nothing to subsume content over form, 
or prevent us from engaging the phenomenal world. We are once again returned to the 
pre-Socratic state, but this time Olson is offering projective verse and objectism to prevent 
the domination of logos. Projective verse and objectism will be the "stone" and "new tufa" 
that build the new tower of humanism. 
It will take new stone, new tufa, to finish off this rising tower. 
(Collected Poems 190) 
"La Torre," is an extension in verse of Olson's prose ideas expressed in "Human 
Universe," The Special View of History, and Muthologos; and, as such demonstrates that 
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his desire for the outcome of his critique of Greek metaphysics was not utter chaos, but a 
new and redeemed humanity (The Special View of History 11; Muthologos 2: 86). 
The epistemological posture Olson elaborates on in the essay "Human Universe" 
provides the outline for much of his thought on an alternative to Greek metaphysics. 
Although Olson is perhaps most famous for his 1950 essay "Projective Verse," the issues 
that he addresses in this seminal essay were to crop up again and again in his poetry and 
prose. Indeed, the majority of Olson's work between his most productive literary period, 
from 1950 with the publication of"Projective Verse" to his death in 1970, can be seen as 
an attempt to answer two major questions: the problems of modem language and poetry 
and the search for a viable alternative to the Western tradition of Greek metaphysics. 
Olson's attack on the Western tradition centers on what he sees as the errors of 
Greek metaphysical inquiry that began with the appearance of Socrates around 450 B.C. 
In Olson's mind, Socrates, with his dialectical reasoning and willingness to generalize, was 
the first to remove the emphasis on human speech in language. Socrates favored logos, 
reason, and logic over the spoken, irrational and post-logical, and his ideas were further 
disseminated by Plato and Aristotle. Plato's idealism and Aristotle's hierarchical system of 
logic and classification further contributed to humanity's separation from Olson's concept 
of the original human universe. "Projective Verse" only deals implicitly with the poetic 
implications of post-Socratic metaphysics. However, it is in Human Universe, The Special 
View of History, various interviews collected in Muthologos, and elsewhere in his notes 
that Olson specifically addresses the philosophical problems inherent in the Greek 
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epistemological tradition. Here Olson specifically attacks the philosophy, grammar, 
syntactical structure, and world view of post-Socratic philosophy. illtimately, it is his 
critique of Greek metaphysics that is perhaps the main unifying notion of Olson's project. 
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Conclusion 
Charles Olson has been read equally as the last of the modem American poets in 
the imagist line ofPound and Williams and as the first of the postmodem poets. He is 
criticized and applauded by critics for his loose appropriation of grammatical rules, his 
ideas about poetry and America, his lack of documentation, and his refusal to 
wholeheartedly accept the assumptions of modernity. Olson is essentially a paradoxical 
figure who cannot be easily categorized. His wealth of prose material deals with such 
diverse topics as Greek philosophy, Whitehead, modem poetics, history, grammar, 
Melville, and D.H. Lawrence among other things. However, Olson is known primarily as 
a poet and has published a wealth of poetry in collections such as The Maximus Poems, as 
well as numerous shorter poems that have appeared in various collections including 
Selected Writings, Archaeologist of Morning, and Collected Poems. Elements of Olson's 
poetics can be found in the works of many postmodem American poets, perhaps due to 
the canonical acceptance of "Projective Verse" by American postmodernism. Indeed, 
Olson's "Projective Verse" is commonly anthologized in collections ofpostmodem 
American poetry and its relevance can still be seen in more recent work by American poets 
like Michael McClure. 
McClure's 1997 collection Rain Mirror is explicitly referred to as projective verse. 
Discussing the creative process of the collection in the preface to Rain Mirror, McClure 
says "I'm astonished at the vigor of projective verse which brought forth energy at the 
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time of the writing" (viii). McClure relied upon Olson's formulation of the poem as 
energy-construct and kinetic entity in writing Rain Mirror, but the content and meaning of 
McClure's poem also take on a visual style that is reminiscent of Olson's own typography. 
Whitehead and Heraclitus, central figures in Olson's prose and poetry, appear in the 
collection, but it is McClure's use of caesurae and random capitalization of key words and 
ideas that create a typography that is Olsonian: 
GOING 
the way of all flesh, 
CAUGHT IN THE ROAR OF THE PLANES 
PASSING OVER 
while the bronze bell rings 
in the wind 
It's all the same: 
"Agathon kai kakon tauton," 
writes dark Herakleitos. 
"We think in generalities but we live 
in detail," replies Whitehead. 
Ten trillion facets swirl and collide 
bound up by senses 
INTO 
THE 
TASTE 
of one grain of black-purple rice ... 
(Rain Mirror 72) 
Because of its elusive nature, the study of postmodem poetry is uneasily identified and 
defined. There is no general consensus on the evaluation of its effects. For example, the 
diverse range of differences in poets such as Olson, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Jack Kerouac, 
Philip Whalen, Denise Levertov, John Ashberry, Gary Snyder, Michael McClure and Amiri 
Baraka (LeRoi Jones) makes it difficult to neatly define postmodem poetry. Olson's 
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projective verse could be very valuable as a model or touchstone for understanding the 
many diverse elements often present in postmodern American poetry. It would be very 
difficult, indeed, to read or even understand the radical abandonment of prescribed form 
that characterizes postmodern American poetry without having sufficient knowledge of 
Olson's poetics and the events in literary history that led to projective verse. Olson is a 
seminal figure in American poetry but he is often overlooked as a serious figure because of 
the initial critical bias toward him as a poet who was merely derivative ofPound and 
Williams. This critical bias unfairly relegated Olson to the status of a minor figure in 
American postwar poetry. 
To be sure, Olson requires a considerable amount of dedication, knowledge, and 
familiarity for the significance of his work to be appreciated. His thoughts on poetry, 
language, philosophy, and history share similarities with the phenomenology ofHeidegger, 
long before these ideas were generally accepted and studied as part of mainstream North 
American critical theory. Olson has also been useful as a figure in recent feminist theory 
approaches to conceptions of the body in feminist poetry. In her analysis ofDaphne 
Marlatt's revision of Olson's projective verse, Sabrina Reed acknowledges that Marlatt 
challenges her allegiance to Olson's poetics in acquiring her feminist version of Olson's 
theories of the body and its relation to poetry. The body, in Olson's poetry, represents 
"freedom" from "societal and poetic norms" (Reed 137). Olson's body is obviously a male 
body and so his conception of the body must be revised if it is to be applied to a feminist 
discourse on poetry. 
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It is also interesting to note that Olson's poetics can be appropriated by and 
understood through diverse areas ofpoststructuralist theory. Olson's ideas about 
discourse and power certainly require a greater analysis than has been given in this thesis. 
Obvious studies of Olson's discursive theories would involve Foucault, Barthes 
(particularly his ideas about mythology), and Bakhtin (if the differences between Bakhtin's 
orientation toward the novel could be reconciled with Olson's poetic oeuvre). Although 
there has been some work accomplished in the area of the Olson-Heidegger affinity, a 
definitive study has not yet been done. There is also a significant amount of unpublished 
work contained in the Olson Archive at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. For 
example, before his death in 1970 Olson had written but not finalized versions of 
"Projective Verse If' and had reformulated ideas that he began in "Human Universe." 
Unfortunately, since the death of George F. Butterick, the publication of previously 
unpublished Olson material has slowed significantly. 
Charles Olson was the first postwar American poet to embrace the designation of 
postmodern, although his relationship to the concepts that generally typify postmodernism 
is problematic. Olson is postmodern in a Lyotardian sense as he signifies the beginning of 
a true modernism that is not dependent upon previous assumptions of modernity. In this 
way, he is a substantial figure in postmodern American poetry as demonstrated by the 
wealth of knowledge contained in his large body of work. In any study of postmodernism 
in American poetry, Olson should be seen as a figure who typifies the paradoxical notions 
that postmodernism implies. Olson's poetry and prose challenge the boundaries of 
121 
modernity while simultaneously subverting many of the assumptions that are, far too oft~ 
taken for granted as given in poetry, language, and even philosophy. The diverse range of 
topics contained in his poetry and prose requires a much deeper evaluation of his work. 
There is still much work to be done in the area of Olson studies. 
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